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SKYJACKING: ITS DOMESTIC CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL RAMIFICATIONSt
Michael C. McClintock*
There is no more pressing problem facing the world aviation
community today than the problem of aircraft hijacking. From
January 1 to July 31, 1972, there was a total of twenty-six sky-
jackings of American commercial airliners-a number equivalent
to the total number of skyjackings in 1971. To deter and counter
air piracy, the government and airlines of the United States have
implemented an unprecedented program of security control. In this
article, Mr. McClintock observes that even though the strict se-
curity measures and the "get tough" policy of the United States
government have greatly reduced the number of skyjackings, the
number of passenger injuries and deaths occurring as a result of
skyjackings has correspondingly increased. After reviewing the
available theories of liability against the hijacker, the airlines and
the government, the author concludes that while the criminal law
of skyjacking is becoming firmly established, civil liability is still
maturing. In the future, the resourcefulness of the aviation bar will
play a significant role in this development.
It is difficult to imagine a more
frightening and dangerous event
than armed piracy of a passenger
aircraft in flight. The extreme
penalty reflects the concern of
Congress and at the same time
enhances the probability that a
desperate man will destroy the
aircraft and the lives of all
aboard rather than fail in his
attempt . .. .
t Adapted and updated by the author from M. McClintock, Aircraft Hijack-ing: Its Civil and Criminal Ramifications, April 1, 1971 (unpublished thesis in
SMU Law School Library) [hereinafter cited Thesis].
* Assistant Professor of Law, Gonzaga University. B.A., J.D., University of
Tulsa; LL.M., S.J.D. candidate, Southern Methodist University. Member of the
Oklahoma Bar.
1 United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 772 (4th Cir. 1972) (defendant
was arrested-for attempting to board an aircraft carrying a concealed weapon
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T HE SKYJACKING era began only a few years ago with acomic-opera aura of unexpected excursions to Havana. But
that has now changed. Recent events reveal hijackings to be an
ugly and dangerous matter. The ascendant reality is that every hi-
jacking sets in motion a chain of events that contain chilling po-
tential for disaster. The continual acts of air violence increasingly
threaten the lives and safety of hundreds of crew members and fare-
paying passengers. Passengers are repeatedly exposed to potential
physical harm during a skyjack not only from the hijacker, but
also from security personnel who may use counterforce as a de-
terrent. Consequently, the motto of air travel-"safety"-is placed
in doubt, and there has been a serious setback in the air carrier
image.'
-after he passed through and activated a preboard anti-hijack screening system).
The penalty referred to for conviction of aircraft piracy is imprisonment for not
less than twenty years or death, if affirmatively recommended by a jury verdict or
if ordered in the court's discretion. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 5
902(i)(1)(B), 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i)(1)(B) (1970). But see Furman v. Georgia,
- U.S. -, 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972) (five to four decision), holding Georgia and
Texas statutory "death penalty" provisions unconstitutional as cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments since they allowed the
imposition of the death penalty for rape and murder at the discretion of the judge
or jury. The Court found this resulted in the death penalty being discriminatorily
applied to different defendants convicted of the same crime. Mr. Justice Douglas
said: "The high service rendered by [the Eighth Amendment] is to require legis-
latures to write penal laws that are evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary,
and to require judges to see to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, se-
lectively, and spottily to unpopular groups. . . . These discretionary statutes are
unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and
discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection
of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishment." Id. at
2735.
2 See, e.g., The Spokesman-Review, Aug. 19, 1972, at 1, cols. 1-7. A middle-
aged gunman who hijacked a United Air Lines jet and demanded $2-million was
shot in the shoulder and leg by FBI agents posing as a relief crew.
Dr. David G. Hubbard, the Dallas psychiatrist and skyjacking expert who de-
veloped the "FAA behavioral profile," believes the use of counterforce is unwise.
Dr. Hubbard thinks the use of counterforce may cause even greater tragedies.
"These people look normal, but they're not," he says. "They're all crazy and
they're all dangerous. Trying to control them by threats and force simply en-
courages them." There has been, in fact, a general escalation in the rate and
types of skyjackings as the effort to fight back has been stepped up. "Soon,"
warns Dr. Hubbard, "we are going to have a 747 go down with 400 dead. We
are going to have a catastrophe." LIFE, Aug. 11, 1972, at 27, 29.
' One reported: "It is horrible, when we were almost on the verge of total
acceptance from the safety viewpoint, that this had to come up and add a new
element of fear." Watkins, Hijacking Impact Swells Airline Problems, Av. Week
& Space Technology, Sept. 21, 1970, at 28-29.
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There are obvious criminal, and less obvious civil, ramifications
to these incidents. The airlines and the government are taking steps
to prevent the hijacker from getting on the plane, or at least from
successfully completing the crime if once aboard. Some of these
steps, such as the preboard "profile and electronic" screening, raise
interesting constitutional issues. In addition, there are important
legal questions with respect to the civil consequences of air piracy,
e.g., who, if anyone, is liable for personal injury to the passenger
or for damage to his belongings? Rhetorically, is there an identifi-
able body of existing air law upon which to base a cause, or causes,
of action; and if so, what are the tenable theories of recovery?
Although the state of the law in this area is presently unsettled,
the matter can be explored by apposite analogy and argument.
I. THE PHENOMENON IN CURRENT PERSPECTIVE
A. The Act Legally Defined
"Skyjacking" is variously referred to as "aircraft piracy" and
"aircraft hijacking." While these terms have the same meaning,
"skyjacking" seems to be gaining in popular usage. Some writers
prefer the term "aircraft hijacking" since it connotes commandeer-
ing an aircraft by seizing control and diverting its course from the
scheduled destination. This is distinct from "piracy," which implies
robbery, pillage or depredations of the goods of another at sea for
personal self-enrichment." Sea piracy then is only really useful for
historic analogy.
4Piracy, by customary rule of international law, is a universal crime. A pirate
is an outlaw who loses the protection of his home state and his national charac-
ter. Pirates attack and rob all nations indiscriminately; these practices make
them the enemies of the human race and of the international community of
states. Pirates place themselves completely outside the law of peaceful peoples.
Persons and vessels engaged in piratical operations are entitled to the protection
of no nation. Therefore, a pirate may be brought to summary justice anywhere,
by anyone, as an enemy of every state. There is universal tacit consent to the
suppression of piracy by all states by whatever means possible. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1306 (4th ed. 1968); 2 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 681 (1941).
A comprehensive treatment of piracy is found in the Research in Interna-
tional Law Under the Auspices of the Harvard Law School, prepared in 1926 for
use by the First Conference on the Codification of International Law convened
by the League of Nations. See Articles of Convention, Piracy, 26 AM. J. INT'L
L. 743 (Supp. 1932).
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, article 15(1)(a) defines
piracy: "Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, com-
mitted for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a pri-
1973]
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The penalties for piracy at sea have long been established and
well enforced, i.e., the pirate commits a crime against the law of
nations, and accordingly, is a common criminal subject to summary
punishment by the first authority that catches him. Although rustlers
in the wild west shared a similar fate on the hanging tree, the same
degree of legal certainty does not exist for piracy in the air for two
basic reasons. First, the crime of piracy in the air is technically hi-
jacking and not piracy. Second, the object of the crime, a jet air-
liner, is unique. Thus, the legal status of air piracy is clouded. It
is uncertain whether the perpetrators are always guilty of a crime
or if their deed will be punished.
There is no particular international law proscribing skyjacking
as a "crime" to parallel the customary laws regarding piracy at sea.'
Concrete international convention and domestic municipal law,
however, is developing. It is this law that forms the foundation for
the legal meaning of skyjacking. Presently, the crime of aircraft
hijacking is exclusively statutory, code or convention law. For
example:
By statute, the crime of air piracy in the United States is speci-
fically defined to mean: Any unlawful seizure or exercise of control
of an aircraft in flight in air commerce by force, violence or threat.'
Congress expressly rejected the proposal to apply the concept of
piracy on the high seas. Instead, the crime was limited to the statu-
tory definition even though the lawmakers admittedly meant to
proscribe an offense against the law of nations."
The Argentine Penal Code defines aircraft hijacking to be: Any
act of depredation or violence against an aircraft in flight, or on
the ground maneuvering prior to take-off, or against persons or
property within the aircraft. The crime includes any acts of viol-
vate aircraft, and directed on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft." Convention on the
High Seas, Sept. 30, 1962, [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200. But see
Wurfel, Aircraft Piracy-Crime Or Fun?, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 820, 840
(1969) for a criticism as to the general inapplicability of this treaty to the con-
temporary problem of air piracy or hijacking. The article also discusses United
States statutory and case law on sea piracy.
'Ruppenthal, World Law And The Hijacker, NATION, Feb. 3, 1969, at 145.
See also Lawrence, Aerial Piracy-An International Crime, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Sept. 21, 1970, at 116.
1 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 902(i), 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i) (1970).
12 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2567 (1961).
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ence, threat of violence or fraud in usurping the command of the
aircraft with the intent to seize it and take possession of its persons
and property.!
The Australian Aircraft Crimes Act of 1963 defines an aircraft
hijacker to mean: Any person who without lawful excuse takes or
exercises control on board the aircraft, whether directly or through
another person. The act can be done by force, violence, threat,
trick or false pretense."
The Mexican Penal Code proscribes the crime of air piracy and
defines it to mean: Anyone who makes an aircraft change its desti-
nation through threats, violence, intimidation or by any other un-
lawful means, or makes it deviate from its route."0
The 1963 Tokyo Convention On Offenses And Certain Other
Acts Committed On Board Aircraft defines unlawful seizure of
aircraft as: Any act of interference, seizure or other wrongful ex-
ercise of control of an aircraft in flight, by force or threat of force."
The 1970 ICAO Draft Convention On The Unlawful Seizure
Of Aircraft defines an "offense" (without further label) to mean:
Any unlawful seizure or exercise of control of an aircraft by force,
threat or any other form of intimidation. The offense includes an
attempted offense and covers any person on board an aircraft in
flight, or that person's accomplice.'"
The 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft uses the expression "unlawful seizure of air-
craft" without further definition. Article 1, however, does specify
the acts constituting "the offense." The description of these acts
is similar to the Tokyo Convention, so presumably the construction
is identical.'"
8 Reprinted at: ICAO Draft Convention On The Unlawful Seizure Of Air-
craft, ICAO Doc. 8877-LC/161, at 108 (1970).
9Id. at 110.
'
0 Id. at 117.
n Convention On Offenses And Certain Other Acts Committed On Board
Aircraft (Tokyo Convention), June 30, 1969 [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No.
6768, at 7-8.
1International Civil Aviation Organization, Legal Committee, Seventeenth
Session (Feb. 9 - Mar. 11, 1970): "Minutes And Documents Relating To The
Subject Of Unlawful Seizure Of Aircraft-Draft Convention," ICAO Doc.
8877-LC/161, at 12.
13 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened
for signature Dec. 16, 1970, ICAO Doc. 8920 at 1. Other articles provide that
a state must prosecute the accused hijacker under its own laws if that state elects
19731
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For purposes of this discussion, it would be useful to extrapolate
a composite definition for skyjacking. Hence, the crime of skyjack-
ing is committed when a person, or his accomplice, seizes, exercises
or usurps control of an aircraft in flight from its lawful pilots and
crew, whether by trick, fraud, violence, force or intimidation, in-
tending to divert or change its course and direction contrary to its
scheduled operations. Although this combination is necessarily con-
trived, the definition of skyjacking is placed within four comers.
B. Present Skyjacking Count
1. Worldwide
The technology of rapid commercial jet travel between countries
and the cold war politics of division that separates peoples and na-
tions along ideological-nationalistic lines provide the ingredients for
a successful skyjacking of an aircraft. A jet airliner, whether on
the ground loaded with crew and passengers or in the air at an
altitude of 30,000 feet, is highly vulnerable. Hijackings rarely occur
intrastate mainly because the expectation of capture and prosecu-
tion is certain. Consequently, skyjackers generally seek to divert
flights to nations of safe haven; i.e., a state politically at odds with
the state of the aircraft's registry."
There are current international efforts to proscribe the crime of
air piracy and to reinforce that law with effective means of prosecu-
tion. 5 The probabilities of arriving at workable agreements are
good because of the recent proliferation of those acts of violence
involving the airlines of other nations. Of course, the development
of international law must necessarily interface with the criminal law
already in force in this country."
Yet, despite these steps, there have been increased attacks on
international and domestic civil aviation. Persons armed with
not to extradite. See generally Mankiewicz, The 1970 Hague Convention, 37 J.
AIR L. & COM. 195, 199 (1971).
14 See statement of John J. O'Donnell, President, Airline Pilots Association,
in U.S. News & World Report, July 3, 1972, at 13. Until the United States and
other governments unite to impose severe penalties, air pirates are going to be
tempted to hit again and again. Id. at 11.
"1 For the international aspects of skyjacking, see Symposium, New Develop-
ments in the Law of International Aviation: The Control of Aerial Hijacking, 65
AM. J. INT'L L. 71 (1971); Symposium, The Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft: Ap-
proaches to the Legal Problems, 37 J. Am L. & CoM. 163-234 (1971); Thesis,
at 114-35.
"e See text at n.107.
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knives, guns and explosives have skyjacked as many aircraft to
carry out their own personal and political vendettas in the first eight
months of 1972 as were skyjacked during the entire year of 1971.1"
From 1948 to August 1, 1972, there were 247 skyjackings in-
volving the registry aircraft of forty-three different nations."
The statistics since 1970 also show lone men committed fifty-six
per cent of the skyjackings; twenty-five per cent of the skyjackings
were committed by two or more men as a team, while groups of
men and women (including some families) were involved in six-
teen per cent.'" More importantly, coercion was used in every sky-
jack: sixty-four per cent with a pistol, rifle or automatic weapon;
twenty-five per cent with explosive materials such as bombs, gre-
nades or gasoline; and seven per cent with cutlery such as a knife
or razor." Thus, one-quarter of skyjackers used explosives, which
if triggered, would undoubtedly have been fatal to all persons on
board. Guns and knives even though lethal are more individual than
group oriented. Significantly, the effective and real coercion is al-
ways against the passengers. This is why skyjacks are successful.
2. United States
On a cumulative basis, forty-two per cent of all skyjackings have
occurred to aircraft of this country. 1 The principal reasons are two-
fold: the open nature of political activity in this country, which
means increased vulnerability; and the American supremacy in the
airline passenger industry. Thus, the registered aircraft of the
United States are frequent targets. Of the twenty-one domestic air
carriers that have been victimized, National Airlines has been the
hardest hit at sixteen per cent; Trans World Airlines is second at
twelve per cent; then Eastern Airlines at ten per cent. Delta Air-
lines and Pan American Airlines share a figure of seven per cent.
The remaining fourteen air carriers, after United Air Lines at six
per cent and Northwest Airlines at four per cent, are fairly even
"7U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 3, 1972, at 11; LIFE, August 11, 1972,
at 26. Although hijacking attempts are up thirty-three per cent, the success rate
has dropped-from eighty-five per cent in 1969 to thirty-seven per cent thus far
this year.
1 See APPENDIX infra, Tables I & 11(A).
19 Id. at Table M(A).201d. at Table III(B).
21 Id. at Tables I & 11(A).
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with one or two hijackings apiece." The statistics, of course, are
constantly changing.
Skyjacking for the United States began on May 1, 1961, when
an armed Cuban exile named Elphi Crosisi entered the cockpit of
a National Airlines plane on a flight from Marathon to Key West,
Florida, and forced the pilot to fly to Cuba.' Skyjackings today,
however, involve a far more dangerous element than the homesick
Cuban. For example, extortions-especially since the infamous D.
B. Cooper incident---have become fashionable.' Nevertheless, air-
line officials are worried more about the occasional, yet deadly,
bomb threats' and the drastic counterforce used by the FBI," than
they are about extortion demands since this potential for violence
directly jeopardizes many lives.
C. Increasing Peril for Passengers
Until recently, passengers have escaped personal injury and loss
of life or property because the violence occurred to the pilots and
crew members or to the aircraft itself.28 Yet the probability for pas-
22 Id. at Table IV. The air carriers on east coast routes and those that termi-
nate in Florida bear the onus because of their close proximity to Cuba.
23N.Y. Times, May 2, 1961, at 1, col. 6. Crosisi reportedly considered him-
self to be the reincarnation of a Spanish Main pirate by the name of Cofrisi.
' See N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1972, at 28, col. 5. Four out of the first five hijack
attempts in 1972 involved persons who, noting apparent success of D. B. Cooper
in parachuting from aircraft after receiving $200,000 in ransom, have tried to
duplicate that act in one fashion or another. See also NEWSWEEK, Jan. 31, 1972,
at 54.
5 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Jan. 3, 1972, at 15. See, e.g., N.Y. Times,
July 13, 1972, at 1, col. 3 (more than $1 million asked in hijacking of two jets);
N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1972, at 1, col. 5 (three hijack jet for $1 million and order
craft to Algeria).
26 A live bomb was discovered on a TWA flight on March 7, 1972 following
a call demanding $2 million in exchange for information as to the bombs where-
abouts. Later the same evening a bomb did explode aboard a TWA 707 jetliner
parked at the Las Vegas Airport completely destroying its flight deck. In addition,
another bomb was discovered aboard a United Airlines jet in Seattle. U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT, Mar. 20, 1972, at 22.
27 A good example was the July 31 hijack of a Delta DC-8 over Florida by
a group of five adults and three children. At the time the record $1 million ran-
som was being handed over, FBI agents were ready to begin shooting until Delta
officials insisted they stay clear. The plane flew off unscathed to Algeria. See
LIFE, Aug. 11, 1972, at 26-27; N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
28 In 1970-71, thirty-six persons were killed or wounded in the course of at-
tempted skyjackings. Sixty million dollars worth of property damage was suffered
in 1970 alone due to the destruction of aircraft. The economic losses caused by
diversion of aircraft and crews from commercial service was also considerable.
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sengers harm is great considering the ingredients: an emotionally
unstable or criminally hardened skyjacker; lethal weapons, such as
guns and explosives; and the inherent vulnerability of passengers
and aircraft.
1. The Threat From The Skyjacker
The United States hijacking experience has produced two au-
thoritative studies on the social and psychological composition of
skyjackers." These studies reveal several types of hijackers: the
"homesick" Cuban; mentally disturbed persons including misfits,
psychopaths and the lunatic fringe; criminals and fugitives from
justice; and, lastly, political extremists and fanatics who hijack
planes for blackmail or terror.3" A composite profile of hijacker
mentality reveals that they are all mentally unstable, suicidal and
belligerent losers at everything they attempt and are between six-
teen and thirty-five years of age. In addition, they all have a gen-
eral pattern of "inadequacy" in their education, jobs and personal
lives. Most of them share dreams and fantasies of being able to fly.
Moreover, almost all hijackers are making fantasy escapes; they
are running from something. They see themselves entering Utopia
as heroes and contemplate dying a heroic death. Many hijackers
call hijacking a "tremendous thrill." They take over large aircraft
and for a moment control the destiny of many people. Most of all,
the hijacker wants attention. It is a moment of power and glory
they expect to sustain once they reach their destination.
Rein, A Government Perspective [Hijacking Symposium], 37 J. AIR L. & COM.
183-93 (1971).
2 Dr. John Dailey, the chief of the Federal Aviation Administration's psy-
chology staff, did a six-month study of skyjackers. The FAA has kept most of
the study secret for security reasons. LIFE, April 18, 1969, at 220.
Dr. David Hubbard, a Dallas psychiatrist, has served as consultant both to
the federal prison system and to the FAA and served as director of the Aberrant
Behavior Center. He has interviewed and studied forty-eight skyjackers. LIFE,
Aug. 11, 1972, at 26; NEWSWEEK, Aug. 24, 1970, at 69. See generally, D. HuB-
BARD, THE SKYJACKER: His FLIGHTS OF FANCY (1971). A special characteristic
noted by Dr. Hubbard is a streak of irrationality that often shows itself in a mix-
ture of sophisticated planning and naive action.
so See, e.g., note 2 supra. In several statements read over local radio stations,
the hijacker said he was part of a "well-organized paramilitary organization fed
up with Nixon's broken promises. . . ." Authorities quoted him as saying the
hijack "is part of an organized effort to destroy United Air Lines aircraft until
the Vietnam war is ended." The hijacker, before being shot by FBI agents, had
demanded: $2 million in $20 and $50 bills, fifteen one-pound gold bars, two
Magnum pistols and three submachine guns, clothing, flashlights, food, medicine
and handcuffs.
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Every skyjack represents a threat to the lives of all on board the
aircraft. An increase in the number of desperate and irrational acts
taken by frustrated hijackers has seemingly followed every effort to
intensify anti-hijack measures: more passengers are becoming vic-
tims, either intentionally3 or unintentionally.32 For example, twenty-
four passengers were killed and seventy-eight wounded inside Tel
Aviv's Lod International Airport in one of the most callous of the
Mid-East terrorist acts.' Unhappily, a tragic trend is developing-
passengers are being singled out as targets of skyjacker violence.
2. The Threat From The Counterforce
The first passenger to be killed during a skyjacking attempt
in the United States was Howard L. Franks on June 11, 1971.'
He was caught in the onboard cross-fire between the hijacker and
an armed co-pilot and sky-marshal. A similar tragedy occurred on
July 5, 1972; E. H. Stanley Carter was fatally wounded in an ex-
change of gunfire between two hijackers and FBI agents aboard a
Pacific Southwest airliner at San Francisco International Airport.'
In each instance, both victims reportedly were killed by the sky-
jackers.
It is becoming clear that government security agencies responsi-
ble for United States anti-hijack measures are adopting a hard line
toward skyjackers-a "get tough" policy modeled after the counter-
measures used by Israel.' The consequence undoubtedly will be
31 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 25, 1971, at 25, col. 1. A stewardess and passen-
ger were shot during the hijacking to Havana of a National Airlines DC-8.
32 On February 21, 1970, an explosion occurred aboard a Swiss airliner bound
for Israel shortly after takeoff from Zurich. All thirty-eight passengers and nine
crew members were killed. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1970, at 1, col. 2. Palestine
Arabs were widely thought to be responsible. Not long after this tragedy, Arab
guerrillas hijacked four jets and held 300 men, women and children hostage and
under threat of death in the Jordanian desert. All the planes (worth $50 million),
including a Pan Am 747, were blown-up. Fortunately, a negotiated release was
obtained for the passengers. See Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Sept. 14, 1970,
at 33-38; LIFE, Sept. 18, 1970, at 30-37; U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 21,
1970, at 20-21.
a' TIME, June 12, 1972, at 23-25; NEWSWEEK, June 12, 1972, at 57-58.
3N.Y. Times, June 13, 1971, at 1, col. 5. Franks demanded to be flown to
North Vietnam but was shot and seized by FBI agents and police while aboard
a TWA Boeing 727 on the ground at Kennedy International Airport.
"' N.Y. Times, July 6, 1972, at 1, col. 5. The two skyjackers, who had held
eighty-six passengers hostage while they waited for $800,000 in ransom, were
also killed. Two other passengers were wounded in the gun battle.
31 See, e.g., TIME, May 22, 1972, at 29 (a good example of the anti-hijack tactics
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more passenger injuries and even deaths. This emergent fact may
result in new litigation aimed at expanding the liability of the air-
lines, and particularly that of the government, to compensate sky-
jack victims.
II. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR PASSENGER INJURY OR DEATH
An estimated nine to ten thousand passengers have been aboard
skyjacked United States registered aircraft.' The exact number of
injuries and deaths resulting from these incidents is not known, but
it is believed to be low. This probably explains the limited number
of suits that have been filed. Recent events, however, may signal a
change.
A passenger on a skyjacked flight conceivably could suffer sev-
eral kinds of compensable damage for which the skyjacker, the
airline and even arguably the government would be jointly or
severally liable"; e.g., death; physical injury; mental anguish or
mental disorder inflicted by the trauma of the skyjack experience;'
loss or damage to personal property; delay or substitute travel ex-
penses incurred in being unable to make an interconnecting flight
used by Israel). The same "get tough" policy seems now to have been adopted
by government security agencies in this country. LIFE, Aug. 11, 1972, at 26-27, 30.
In May, FAA Administrator John Shaffer reportedly told pilots, "there's been a
change in attitudes . . . a new and harsher attitude we're all taking toward these
incidents." Authorities have said the use of force would no longer be off limits.
The FBI, for example, no longer forbids agents to storm passenger-filled planes.
Screening and other pre-board measures are not enough, reported FAA security
chief Murphy.
Airline officials traditionally have opposed the use of force on board aircraft;
the risks involved in an aerial gun battle appeared too great to take. The policy
was one of absolute and complete submissiveness. See Wurfel, Aircraft Piracy-
Crime Or Fun?, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 820, 863-65 (1969); Woolsey, Preven-
tion Of Hijacking Switches From Passive To Active Measures, Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECMNOLOGY, Sept. 21, 1970, at 29. Standing instructions of a major airline to all
its flight officers: "In the event of an armed threat to any crew member, comply
with the demands presented. The most important consideration under the act of
aircraft piracy is the safety of the lives of the passengers and crew. Any other
factor is secondary." Id. (excerpt from Eastern Airlines Flight Brief).
37 One hundred skyjackings times an estimated average passenger count of
ninety to 100 per plane. See APPENDIX infra, Tables II(A) & IV.
38 See generally Abramovsky, Compensation for Passengers of Hijacked Air-
craft, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 339-59 (1972) [hereinafter cited Compensation for
Passengers]; Comment, Aircraft Hijacking: Criminal and Civil Aspects, 22 U.
FLA. L. REV. 72-100 (1969) [hereinafter cited Aircraft Hijacking].
"9See Compensation for Passengers at 347-49. Abramovsky gives special at-
tention to case law bearing on recovery for negligently inflicted mental distress.
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or other travel connections; or even loss to business of a valuable
contract bid or client because of the delay. These are just a few of
the possibilities. The general law of air carrier and government
liability provides the only reference for analogy to the skyjack
situation. The rules with respect to the duty of care owed the pas-
senger are sufficiently well-developed to form a basis for discussion.
A. Civil Suit Against the Skyjacker
The skyjacker is the most obvious defendant for civil suit in the
event a passenger is injured or killed. But he is also the least likely
to be able to respond in money damages. Indeed, most skyjackers
are judgment proof."0 In addition, many skyjackings succeed and the
culprit escapes; rarely are they extradited. Moreover, those hi-
jackers who are arrested face criminal prosecution and prison sen-
tences." Consequently, the skyjacker, for all practical purposes, is
eliminated from the list of civil defendants.
B. Civil Suit Against the Air Carrier
Every skyjack creates the potential of liability for the carrier.
The law places a high duty of care upon an airline for the safe
carriage of its passengers,'3 including the protection against assaults
by third persons.' Death or injury to a passenger aboard a com-
mandeered flight could result in a successful civil suit against the
air carrier."
1. Breach of Statutory and Regulatory Duties of Care
Section 104 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 declares every
citizen's right of public transit through the navigable airspace of
"°See Aircraft Hijacking, at 90.
"' N.Y. Times, July 24, 1971, at 16, col. 2. This article contains a statistical
summary showing the subsequent disposition of criminal charges that have been
filed against persons accused of air piracy involving United States registered air-
craft.
' See note 59 infra.
"' See note 64 inf ra.
" "It is not suggested that the airlines should be the insurers of their passen-
gers' safety, but it is contended that ... the burden of proof, where serious injury
is suffered by a passenger, should be placed on the airline to show that it has
done everything possible to avert the attacks, regardless of whether or not one of
its own planes was hijacked in the recent past. The airline is in a position to pre-
vent the hijacker from accomplishing his criminal act, while the passenger is in
no way capable of doing so." Compensation for Passengers at 345, 347 (emphasis
added).
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the United States.' Section 404 (a) of the Act imposes an addition-
al duty on every air carrier to provide safe and adequate service,
equipment and facilities in connection with interstate and overseas
air transportation." Since United States citizens have a right to
freedom of air transit and air carriers have a reciprocal duty to
provide safe and adequate service to the passenger, section 1111
of the Act gives the airlines the authority to refuse transportation
when, in the sole judgment of the air carrier, a certain passenger
might be inimical to the safety of the flight.'7 This refusal power,
of course, statutorily balances the section 104 public right of free-
dom of air transit. Since sections 104 and 1111 are complementary
with respect to air transit safety, they impose a high degree of care
and even selectivity on the part of the air carrier to ensure the
safety of passengers who board the plane.
Of even greater importance are the recently promulgated Fed-
eral Aviation Administration regulations specifically dealing with
preboard security measures to be taken by the airlines."8 These new
rules require airlines to install and operate an "approved" FAA
screening system to prevent skyjackers from bringing weapons or
explosives aboard on their person or in carry-on baggage. Section(h) of the regulations provides that "each certificate holder shall
at all times maintain and carry out the [approved] screening system
... and security program .... "' This language is mandatory. Other
SFederal Aviation Act of 1958, S 104, 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1970).
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 404(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(a) (1970).
4 7 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1111, 49 U.S.C. § 1511 (1970). See also
Wolfer v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 12 Avi. 17,186 (Fla. Sm. Cl. Ct. 1971), hold-
ing an air carrier acted reasonably in refusing to permit passenger to board a
flight after the passenger stated in jest: "I don't need any bags to hijack the
plane." Passenger's suit for damages failed. Judge Rainwater said: "[A]ircraft
hijackings, including express or implied threats . . . . pose a serious problem to
the public in general and to the air carrier in particular, and their passengers.
. . . There is no such thing as a joke on the subject . . . . Such jokes are the
equivalent of shouting 'fire' in a crowded auditorium, and may reasonably be
interpreted as presenting a clear and present threat to safety of flight. In any
case, the comic must accept the reasonable consequences flowing from the exer-
cise of such abysmal judgment." Id. at 17,187. The court did not rely on section
1511 of the Act.
48 F.A.R. § 121.538 (Aircraft Security), 37 FED. REG. 2500, as amended by
37 FED. REG. 4904, 5254, 7150 (1972) [hereinafter cited Security Rules]. Once
printed in the FEDERAL REGISTER, an F.A.R. has the force of statutory law. See
also N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1972, at 1, col. 2 & Feb. 6, 1972, pt. IV, at 4, col. 4.
49 F.A.R. § 121.538, 37 FED. REG. 2500, as amended by 37 FED. REG. 4904,
5254, 7150 (1972). Section (c) requires the airlines to submit in writing their
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sections require the pilot to conduct a preflight security inspection
whenever the carrier receives a bomb or air piracy threat against
a particular flight and a postflight check if the threat is received
while the plane is airborne."0 The security plan submitted by the air
carrier must also provide for proper baggage inspection by airline
personnel in addition to measures to prevent unauthorized access
to aircraft."
Importantly, since these new regulations place the burden on air
carriers to implement a preboard screening program designed to
prevent skyjackings, failure to act, or failure to act in accordance
with the regulations, would be a violation of federal statutory law
expressly established for the protection of the flying public. Thus,
a violation would be sufficient to establish negligence per se if the
death or injury to the passenger is the proximate cause of a subse-
quent skyjack." The FAA recently fined two air carriers for vio-
lating these regulations by not taking proper on-ground security
measures to prevent two skyjackings."
2. Breach of Common Law Duty of Care
The most reliable and well-developed theory of recovery lies in
tort for negligence." Aviation law is replete with cases delineating
the duty of care airlines owe the passenger and the resulting liability
for breach of that duty. The cases also develop the possible de-
fenses to a negligence action."
Skyjackings primarily occur aboard those air carriers that are
common carriers," especially the big scheduled airlines." The duty
proposed security program for FAA approval. The FAA, under section (g), re-
tains authority to unilaterally amend the program should changing circumstances
warrant and require even stiffer antihijack measures.
I01d. at (i).
I11d. at § (c)(I)&(2).
An airline obviously would have breached the duty to exercise the highest
degree of care and foresight for its passengers. See note 59 in!ra; Compensation
for Passengers at 345.
"N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1972, at 1, col. 2.
"General negligence law applies to airplane tort cases. See, e.g., United States
v. Schultetus, 277 F.2d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1960).
5See also Thesis 71-79 for a discussion of several possible defenses.
5 A common carrier holds its services out for hire to the general public. It
agrees to carry at a uniform rate, without distinction or difference, all persons
who apply, so long as there is space. See, e.g., Gerard v. American Airlines, Inc.,
272 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1959); Jackson v. Stancil, 253 N.C. 252, 116 S.E.2d 817
(1960).
" A private carrier, such as an air taxi operator, does not offer its services to
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of common carrier airlines to their fare-paying passengers is con-
trolled by state law as modified by standards imposed by federal
legislation and administrative orders." A majority of state courts
hold that common carrier airlines owe passengers the highest de-
gree of care for their safety that is consistent with the operation
and conduct of the airline's business. The high risks of air travel
dictate this standard. This degree of care has also been variously
described as the care of "an unusually prudent and competent car-
rier," "as far as human care and foresight can provide" and "utmost
care." The law, however, does not require air carriers to exercise
all the care, skill and diligence that the human mind could con-
ceive or that would remove all peril from the transportation. A
common carrier by air is only under a duty to protect against those
casualties that can be reasonably foreseen.6" The air carrier is not
an insurer of the passenger's safety; liability for injury or death
must be founded upon some act of negligence or fault."'
Admittedly, skyjackings are more than a reasonably foreseeable
risk of air travel. The contemporary problem of hijacking and its
the general public, but to special clientele. The private carrier reserves the right
to refuse carriage to anyone, even though there might be space. See, e.g., Sleezer
v. Lang, 170 Neb. 239, 102 N.W.2d 435 (1960). Significantly, a private or con-
tract carrier owes its passengers only the duty of "ordinary care."
"6 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment,
347 U.S. 590, 597 (1954).
"'See Arrow Aviation, Inc. v. Moore, 266 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1959); Wilson
v. Capital Airlines, 240 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1957); Lunsford v. Tucson Aivation
Corp., 73 Ariz. 277, 240 P.2d 545 (1952); Roberts v. Trans World Airlines, 225
Cal. App. 2d 344, 37 Cal. Rptr. 291 (Dist. Ct. 1964).
A well-known maxim the law applies is: The greater the danger the greater
the care required. Ziser v. Colonial Western Airways, Inc., 10 N.J. M1118, 162
A. 591 (N.J. 1932).
See also Compensation for Passengers at 343-44, nn.25-29, for a listing of
similar duties of care owed to passengers by common carriers other than airlines.
66Wilson v. Capital Airlines, 240 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1957). The air carrier
was found not liable for an injury in the plane's lavatory to a large elderly fe-
male; the woman had a tumor in the bones around her hip joint which was sus-
ceptible to pathological fracture. The court said: The common carrier is not an
insurer, therefore the mere fact of injury is not sufficient to raise a presumption
of negligence. The carrier is not liable for extraordinary situations not reasonably
foreseeable. The possibility of danger must be ordinary and apparent to the car-
rier for it to be reasonably foreseeable.
61 See Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 929 (D. Del. 1962); Ness
v. West Coast Airlines, 90 Ida. 111, 410 P.2d 965 (1964); Griffith v. United Air-
lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). See generally 1 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION
ACCIDENT LAw § 3.07 (1963).
2 See Compensation for Passengers at 347.
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inherent dangers and risks are ordinary and apparent to everyone.
The notoriety and publicity given the matter is unquestioned. Air-
lines and the government have even undertaken a joint anti-hijack
program aimed at stopping the skyjacker. All of these factors are
capable of judicial notice.
Regardless of the skyjacking threat, the air carrier must still act
with highest care having in mind the safety of its passengers; any
breach of this duty is negligence. Airlines, therefore, are presumably
liable to the victims of a skyjack in the event of a breach.' The
courts very well could move toward a position of imposing absolute
liability on air carriers to compensate passengers." This would
"See, e.g., Ness v. West Coast Airlines, 90 Ida. 111, 410 P.2d 965 (1965).
The airline was held liable for injuries to passengers thrown out of their seats
when the plane encountered air turbulence. The "Fasten Seat Belt" sign was
turned-off. In this case, there was sufficient proof of negligence since various fact-
ors that usually contribute to air turbulence were known to the pilot; i.e. low
pressure area, cold front advancing along course of flight, and terrain features
such as deep canyons and high mountains.
A skyjack petition or complaint against the air carrier might allege any or all
of the following as negligence:
(i) Failure to use the FAA hijacker behavioral profile or the magnetometer
in accordance with FAA regulations.
(ii) Failure to inspect carry-on or stow-away baggage.
(iii) Failure to provide skymarshal or airline security guards aboard the
aircraft.
(iv) Failure to provide cockpit cabin door locks openable only from the inside.
(v) Failure to resist the skyjacker (passively acquiescing to his demands).
(vi) Failure to timely and effectively subdue the skyjacker when the oppor-
tunity presents itself.
(vii) Failure to resist or subdue the skyjacker at a time and place which offers
the minimum danger to the passengers.
"4See, e.g., Miller v. Mills, 257 S.W.2d 520 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953). This case
involved an altercation between a bus driver and two intoxicated passengers. An
innocent passenger was injured by a thrown whiskey bottle. The court found the
bus driver was negligent: he might have reasonably anticipated that objects would
be thrown or even firearms discharged. The driver breached the duty to exercise
the highest degree of care practicable to protect and guard passengers from vio-
lence and assault.
Presumably airlines will be held liable for like conduct on the part of airline
personnel in a skyjack situation. See Compensation for Passengers at 344,
nn.30-37, for development of a line of cases imposing a special duty upon the
common carrier to protect passengers from the wrongful acts of third persons.
The implication of these cases, coupled with the highest duty of care already
owed to passengers for their safety and with the undeniable foreseeability of sky-
jacking, could mean airlines are under an implied obligation to provide a police
force-or at least employ strict security measures-to protect passengers from
skyjacker violence.
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place the financial burden of skyjackings on those best able to guard
against the risk-the airlines."
3. International Ticketed Flights: Absolute Liability
The 1966 Montreal Agreement," which amended (and is to be
read in context with) the 1929 Warsaw Convention,' makes a
United States registered air carrier absolutely liable up to 75,000
dollars of provable damages 8 for the death, wounding or other
bodily injury" to any ticketed passenger whose point of departure,
landing or agreed stopover is international in character."' In addi-
tion, the Montreal Agreement waived the Warsaw article 20(1)
defense of due care.' Hence, one can recover for all compensable
damages on the principle of absolute, no-fault liability up to 75,000
dollars. Even this ceiling limitation may be surpassed if the plaintiff
can prove "willful misconduct" on the part of the air carrier under
the Warsaw Convention.
"See note 44 supra. A special ticket tax to fund a "no-fault" reserve could
provide a ready source of compensation for the skyjack victim.
11 Special Meeting on Limits for Passengers Under the Warsaw Convention
and Hague Protocol [Montreal, Canada], Feb. 1-15, 1966, ICAO Doc. 8584-
LC/154-1&2, CAB Order No. E-23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (eff. May 13, 1966).
See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention,
80 HARv. L. REv. 497, 563-601 (1967).
See also Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air [Guatemala City, Guatemala],
Mar. 8, 1971, ICAO Doc. 8932. The Guatemala Protocol, which is now open for
signature, would further amend Warsaw in several important respects; e.g. raise
the absolute liability ceiling to $100,000, and after a period of ten years to
$125,000; provide the carrier with a contributory negligence defense that would
operate to wholly or partially exonerate the carrier from liability on the principle
of comparative negligence; allow for the awarding of reasonable attorney's fees
at the discretion of the trial court; and provide a more restrictive standard for
defining 'willful misconduct.' See discussion at: Compensation for Passengers at
356-58; 64 DEP'T STATE BULL. 555 (1971); 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 670 (1971);
Mankiewicz, The 1971 Protocol of Guatemala City to Further Amend the 1929
Warsaw Convention, 38 J. Am L. & CoM. 519 (1972).
17 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air [Warsaw, Poland], Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876
(1934).
:8 Montreal, article 1(1).
69 Warsaw, article 17.
70 Warsaw, article 1(a).
71 Montreal, article 1(2).
72 There must be a realization of the probability of injury from the conduct,
and a disregard of the probable consequences of such conduct. "Willful miscon-
duct" (gross negligence) has been variously defined as: (i) a deliberate act not
to discharge some duty necessary to safety (ii) a conscious and willful omission
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The Montreal Agreement offers the carrier a defense; plaintiff's
cause of action has to be independently established, for example,
under a state wrongful death statute 3 or the federal Death on the
High Seas Act.7 4 The carrier interposes the Montreal "ceiling" to
limit its liability. Accordingly, plaintiffs typically seek a two-fold
recovery: First, by asking for a summary judgment of 75,000 dol-
lars under the Montreal Agreement; and second, by alleging "willful
misconduct" under the Warsaw Convention to increase carrier
liability." The first recovery often helps finance the second action.
The combination of Warsaw-Montreal provides a means of ready
compensation for the victim of a skyjack flying on an international
ticket; the passenger would only have to show that he was aboard
the skyjacked plane and then prove his damages up to 75,000
dollars. This is exactly what happened in Herman v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc."6 An infant passenger claimed damages because of
mental anguish" allegedly suffered during a hijacking and seven
days detention in the Jordan desert at the hands of Palestinian
Arab guerrillas in September 1970.8 The defendant air carrier
argued that article 17 of the Warsaw Convention was inapposite
for two reasons: (i) affliction of mental harm did not come within
the meaning of personal injury from "death, wounding, or other
bodily injury"; and (ii) the use of the plane as a detention camp
by the hijackers occurred after the flight had ended. The New York
Superior Court rejected both arguments.
The court found the English words "any other bodily injury" to
have a broad meaning in light of the original French text. Several
from a positive duty (iii) reckless disregard of the consequences. See, e.g., K.L.M.
v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961); Grey v.
American Airlines, 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989
(1956).
Query whether a failure by an air carrier to take the anti-hijack measures and
precautions now required by FAA regulation would rise to the level of "willful
misconduct"?
13 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 377 (West 1954).
-46 U.S.C. § 761-67 (1970).
75 See Interpretation: Dep't of State Memo, United States Government Action
Concerning the Warsaw Convention 4 (1966), reprinted in L. KREINDLER, AvIA-
TION ACCIDENT LAW 380 (Supp. 1970).
7' 330 N.Y.S.2d 829 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
77 Plaintiff asserted she suffered extreme fright, loss of weight and developed
a skin rash. Id. at 830.
71 See note 32 supra.
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concepts were held to be included in addition to physical injury;
e.g., "damage," "prejudice," "wrong" or "hurt.""9 In the opinion
of the New York court, the translated phrase encompassed both
mental and physical injuries. Moreover, mental injury was held
to include "fright and distress." The court further found the condi-
tions of Warsaw article 17 to have been satisfied since plaintiff's
injuries were sustained "both while on board the aircraft during
flight [when the hijacking commenced] and while physically still
on board during the subsequent week of detention in the desert
[while the hijacking was still in progress].""0 The court recognized
that plaintiff had been "held in close confinement by [the] armed
hijackers" both while the plane was in flight and on the ground."'
The act of skyjacking, therefore, was continuous in nature. Con-
sequently, the court concluded that TWA's liability was absolute
under Warsaw-Montreal; the only question was the amount of
damages.
4. Recovery for Damaged or Lost Baggage
Almost every air carrier has filed tariffs with the Civil Aero-
nautics Board to limit its liability for loss or damage to passenger
luggage.' Conditions contained in the tariff are binding on the
passenger regardless of knowledge or assent since tariffs" approved
by the CAB" become part of the contract of carriage between the
airline and the passenger.8 The tariff may even totally exempt the




"'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 403(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1970).
83 Contracts for carriage shall conform to the approved and published tariffs
filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
403(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1970).
84 The "reasonableness" of tariffs, rules, regulations, and practices of air car-
riers are subject, in the first instance, to the primary jurisdiction of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board. Neither state or federal courts have jurisdiction over any matter
within the ambit of the CAB's administrative and regulatory authority until a
litigant has exhausted his remedies before that body. See Herman v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 222 F.2d 326 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 843 (1955); Lichten
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951); Adler v. Chicago & So.
Airlines, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Mo. 1941).
"See, e.g., Mao v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 844 (D.C.N.Y. 1970);
Martin v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 219 Pa. 2d 42, 280 A.2d 647 (Super. Ct.
1971). The passenger, in the latter case, was held bound by the limitation of
liability for baggage loss contained in the air carrier's tariff. Even though the
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airline from liability." The carrier is liable only to the amount de-
clared in its tariff, even though negligent, unless the passenger
declares a higher value and pays an additional charge." Skyjack
victims presumably are in no better position than any other pas-
sengers; they would be bound by filed tariff limitations regarding
recovery for damaged or lost baggage.
C. Civil Suit Against the Federal Government
The federal government, primarily through the Federal Aviation
Administration, is heavily committed in men, money and material
to the implementation of the anti-hijack program. The govern-
ment's activities are closely intertwined with those of the airlines.
On the ground, FAA and airline security personnel closely co-
operate in carrying out preboard screening procedures, which use
the skyjacker behavioral profile that was researched and developed
by the FAA in addition to the electronic weapons-detection equip-
ment. The FBI is even involved; its new "get tough" policy is
designed to end skyjackings-by shooting and wounding or killing
hijackers if necessary." In short, the federal government has under-
taken an extensive and multi-faceted program to stop skyjackings,
all in the interest of aviation safety to protect the public, which
travels as passengers.88
passenger did not read the print on the ticket, the baggage check nor the large
posted signs regarding the baggage liability limitation, he had constructive notice.
88 Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951). The car-
rier's tariff disclaimed all liability for damage or loss of jewelry. This exculpatory
clause was upheld and enforced.
87See, e.g., S. Toepfer, Inc. v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 671 (W.D.
Okla. 1955). See also Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc., 266 N.Y. 244,
194 N.E. 692 (1935). A tariff may limit liability for loss of baggage only if an
option is given to pay a lower fare. This gives the passenger the voluntary choice
of contracting for full or limited liability.
88 See Security Rules.
8 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
' Actions to Deal With the Menace of Air Piracy: Statement by President
Nixon (Sept. 11, 1970), reprinted at 63 DEP'T STATE BULL. 341-43 (1970). This
is probably the most definitive and authoritative statement on the commitment
of the federal government to the anti-hijack program. It represents the official
United States position on the matter; it also formulates the step by step evolve-
ment by the executive branch of plans to deal with the problem of skyjacking.
See also U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 3, 1972, at 11-13, for recent
statements by leading officials regarding Government responsibility for the anti-
hijack program. See generally Rein, A Government Perspective [Hijacking Sym-
posium], 37 J. AIR L. & COM. 183, 184-92 (1971); Volpe & Stewart, Jr., Aircraft
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Skyjacked passengers who suffer personal injury, death or even
personal property damage may be able to sue the government suc-
cessfully. The premise of recovery lies in analogy to the well-
developed body of case law concerning government liability for the
negligent operations of its air traffic controllers.' The same theory
and general principles of law arguably are apposite to government
operations in its anti-hijack program.
1. Liability for "Operating" Negligence
The federal government waived its historic sovereign immunity
and gave its consent to be sued for the negligence of its employees
in the Federal Tort Claims Act." The FTCA, however, contains
certain "exceptions,"'" which in effect preserve sovereign immunity
for certain government activities. A great deal of litigation has
Hijacking: Some Domestic and International Responses, 59 Ky. L.J. 273, 275-89
(1970).
"1 The government's influence is felt in all phases of aviation; it certifies air-
craft airworthiness, provides funds and establishes standards for airport develop-
ment, and operates a multi-billion dollar air traffic control system. Almost every
flight in the United States is controlled to some degree by the government's air
traffic controllers. They provide instructions, weather information, advice and
traffic guidance to pilots.
See generally, Comment, Government Liability-Air Traffic Controllers-
Duty of Care, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 185 (1967); Levy, The Expanding Responsi-
bility of the Government Air Traffic Controller, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (1968);
Noyer, Judicial Trends Reflecting Government Responsibility in Aviation Accident
Litigation, [1968] A.B.A. SECT. INs. N.&C.L. 453 (1968).
'The Federal Tort Claims Act [hereinafter cited FTCA], 28 U.S.C. §5 2671-
680 (1970). See generally Kennelly, Claims and Suits for Aviation Accidents
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, TR. LAW. GUIDE 1 (1972).
See FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970). This section gives district courts
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions or claims against the United States. The
claim must arise out of the negligence of an employee of the federal government
acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where
the United States, if a private person, would be liable.
See also FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970). This section states that the United
States shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances.
93FTCA, 28 U.S.C. S 2680(a), (h) (1970). This statute sets out the "excep-
tions" to the FTCA for which the government still is not liable to suit:
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the govern-
ment, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not the statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the ex-
ercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretion-
ary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of
the government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false ar-
rest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresen-
tation, deceit or interference with contract rights.
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evolved around these FTCA "exceptions," which the government
typically interposes as defenses in a tort action." The most evident
development in the case law is the erosion by the courts of these
remaining immunities. Consequently, the government has been
exposed to broader tort liability."
The FTCA "discretionary function" exception has consistently
been the principal government defense. The landmark decision of
the Supreme Court in Indian Towing Co., Inc. v. United States9
narrowed, and in many respects eliminated, its effectiveness. In
that case, a ship ran aground and was heavily damaged because the
Coast Guard failed to maintain adequately a warning signal in a
lighthouse. The Court found the government liable for negligence
under the FTCA and further held the failure of the Coast Guard to
maintain a signal light was an "operational function," which did not
fall within the "planning and decision making" exception of the
discretionary function rule. An important postulate was therefore
established: Once the government voluntarily and gratuitously un-
dertakes an operation of any type, it must thereafter exercise due
care in the execution of that operation. The decision concluded that
daily operations and activities of government agencies were to be
examined for negligence in the same manner as any private enter-
prise."
"The government, for example, has relied upon the defense of "execution of
a regulation." The government maintained that once it promulgates an operations
manual, and interprets it, a government employee following the manual should
not be liable. The courts have rejected this position. The government could in-
sulate itself from liability by simply testifying as to the interpretation of the man-
ual regardless of the letter of the regulation. See, e.g., Ingham v. United States,
373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967); Weiner v. United
States, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
' See generally Kennelly, Claims and Suits for Aviation Accidents Under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, TR. LAW. GUIDE 1 (1972); Comment, Government
Liability-Air Traffic Controllers-Duty of Care, 33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 185
(1967).
96 350 U.S. 61 (1955). See also Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315
(1957).
" Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956). This court enunciated
the "Good Samaritan" doctrine: once it voluntarily undertakes to perform cer-
tain acts or functions on which others come to rely, the government then must
perform them with due care. Therefore, the government is liable for the actions
of its employees directly dealing with the public in the application of established
policies.
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2. Air Traffic Control Case Law Precedent
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co." determined the extent
of governmental liability in the aviation accident litigation field. A
government Air Traffic Control (ATC) operator negligently cleared
an Eastern DC-4 and a Bolivian military plane to land on the same
runway at the same time. There was a mid-air collision fatal to all
aboard the DC-4. The military pilot escaped with minor injuries.
The government argued that the duties of control tower personnel
were public in nature and involved the exercise of discretion and
judgment. The District of Columbia Circuit rejected this argument
and found the government liable. The court said that the decision
to establish a control tower was within the discretionary function
exception to the FTCA, but the subsequent negligent operation of
the control tower was not discretionary since the type of judgment
exercised was of an "operational" nature that did not involve policy
judgments and decisions. In short, immune governmental discretion
was exercised when the United States decided to build and operate
the ATC tower. Tower personnel, however, had no discretion to
operate it negligently. Thus, the law is clear: Once the government
decides to undertake a project, due care must be exercised in its
daily operational execution or liability results."
There has been increasing judicial recognition that aviation
safety requires the combined efforts of the airlines, via their pilots
and crews, and the government, via its air traffic controllers. The
courts consequently have subjected both airlines and the govern-
ment to concurrent duties and responsibilities toward the pas-
senger, ' with the government air traffic controller having the
98 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955), afJ'd mem. sub nom., United States v. Union
Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1956). The Supreme Court, in affirming the judgment,
cited the Indian Towing case. See also American Airlines v. United States, 418
F.2d 180, 192 (5th Cir. 1969).
"This proposition is firmly established. See, e.g., Spaulding v. United States,
455 F.2d 222, 226 (9th Cir. 1972). The court, in citing the Indian Towing case,
said: " . . . The air traffic controller is required to give all information and warn-
ings specified in his manuals, and in certain situations he must give warnings be-
yond the manuals. This duty is based on the simple tort principle that once the
Government has assumed a function or service, it is liable for negligent per-
formance." (emphasis added). The text and footnotes in Spaulding contain a
good discussion of the leading air law cases dealing with government air traffic
control liability.
100"IT]he standard of due care is concurrent, resting upon both the airplane
pilot and ground aviation personnel. Both are responsible for the safe conduct of
the aircraft ... both are responsible for the safety of airplane passengers." Id.
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greater burden."1 Weather information is a good example of this
expanded scope of duty and liability. It is now the rule that ATC
is under a continuing duty to provide current and accurate weather
information to anyone with whom it is in contact regardless whether
a request is made.0 2 The reason for this duty is because ATC is in
a superior position to gather weather information and has superior
knowledge of air traffic control movement. Pilots, and indirectly
passengers, rely on this knowledge. Thus, ATC must go beyond
the duties outlined in government manuals and operating regula-
tions. They must advise aircraft of all new and significant weather
information that could affect the pilot's decision to take-off or
land." This rationale is also applied to wake turbulence warning
cases.G'" There is a duty to go beyond the approved manual warning
and in the interests of safety either withhold take-off clearance or
deny clearance altogether. Legal responsibility rests with the person
who is in a superior position to recognize and evaluate the danger
and act to prevent an accident. This person is the air traffic con-
troller.
3. Government Liability for Skyjacking
The analogy of federal ATC liability to skymarshal or FBI
liability under the FTCA is clear. The initial decision to undertake
the anti-hijack program was policy-making or planning and thus
exempt under the discretionary function rule, but the daily decisions
101See Ingham v. United States, 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 931 (1967).
10 Black v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Tex. 1969). In this case,
air traffic control failed to give a warning of severe weather conditions existing
within the SIGMET's 150-mile radius because the pilot did not specifically ask
for it. ATC knew, however, that the plane was heading in the general direction
of the adverse weather. The plane subsequently encountered thunderstorms and
crashed. See also Gill v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 253, (E.D. Tex. 1968).
103 Neff v. United States, 420 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1066 (1970). A Mohawk Airlines plane crashed immediately after take-off
when it ran into a violent squall line that had just come onto the field. ATC was
negligent in its failure to monitor closely the thunderstorm that hit the field, and
pass the information on to the aircraft about to take off. The co-pilot's suit against
the government, however, was denied on the basis of his contributory negligence.
.. United States & Baker v. Furumizo, 381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967). A stu-
dent pilot and an instructor in a light plane took off behind a large jet. The jet
created severe Vortex wake turbulence that caused the light plane to crash. See
also Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968). But see Lightenburger
v. United States, 460 F.2d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1972). A twelve-minute persistence
of hazardous turbulence from a wing tip vortex was both improbable and un-
foreseeable.
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and actions of federal security personnel on the job are operational
and ministerial; accordingly the government is subject to suit if
done negligently. Under the Indian Towing doctrine, as applied to
aviation by the Union Trust case, government agents must exercise
due care in all their actions even while executing the current "get
tough" policy to stop skyjackers. In addition, ATC cases mandate
a broad and high degree of care for government activity in aviation
matters because the airlines and the fare-paying public place com-
plete reliance on government action to ensure safety of travel. The
courts predictably will construe the degree of care liberally in favor
of plaintiff passengers and strongly against the defendant govern-
ment.
Moreover, there is some basis for the application of the doctrine
of strict liability,"0' considering the inherent high risk and danger
of skyjacking and the extra hazardous counterforce presently being
used by the FBI. Several decisions indicate the Supreme Court will
not hesitate to apply the same law to the United States as is applied
to a private person including law that does not depend for liability
on the normal common law breach of duty with respect to reason-
able or high care standards."6
III. STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS: AIR PIRACY AND OTHER
RELATED CRIMES ABOARD AIRCRAFT
A. State Jurisdiction and Laws
The authority of states to control the airspace above their ter-
ritory is based upon the necessity of self-protection, an attribute of
10 United States v. Praylou, 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 934 (1954). A plane owned and operated by the United States Government
crashed into plaintiff's barn, destroyed it and seriously injured his children. South
Carolina law incorporated provisions of the Uniform Aeronautics Act which pro-
vided for absolute liability. The court held the FTCA was intended to cover cases
of this sort even though the state law imposed absolute liability for such damage
and not merely liability for negligence.
The Government's position that strict liability should not be applied under
the FTCA finds support in the dictum of Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15,
44-45 (1953). Mr. Justice Reed said: "Liability does not arise by virtue either
of United States ownership of an inherently dangerous commodity or property,
or engaging in an extra hazardous activity." See also United States v. Taylor, 236
F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. granted, 352 U.S. 963, cert. dismissed per stipu-
lation 335 U.S. 801 (1958).
106Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960). See Dostal, Aviation Law
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 24 FED. B.J. 165-96, 177 (1964).
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sovereignty." ' States have authority, except as limited by the powers
granted to the federal government, to regulate in the exercise of
their police power for the public welfare and safety.' In addition,
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958" does not pre-empt consistent
state law, which includes the right to proscribe and punish crimes
committed in a state's territorial airspace. In many respects, state
jurisdiction is concurrent with federal jurisdiction: each comple-
ments the other.
State criminal codes, therefore, are applicable both to domestic
flights of scheduled air carriers and to general aviation. But a
formidable jurisdictional problem exists since state officials must
prove the alleged criminal act was committed in flight over their
territory. This is often difficult, if not impossible, when jet aircraft,
traveling at speeds of over 500 miles per hour and at altitudes of
over 30,000 feet, are involved."' Despite this difficulty, some states
have moved to pass protective legislation relating to crimes aboard
aircraft.111
I7 W. BISHOP, JR., INTERNATIONAL LAW 369-73 (2d ed. 1962).
10'Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930).
This is a leading case in air law; it reiterates the common law principle of inher-
ent state sovereignty and jurisdiction over the superjacent airspace above its terri-
tory. See also Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization & Assess-
ment, 347 U.S. 590, 597 (1954). Existing federal aviation laws do not exclude
the sovereign power of the states.
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 5 101 - 1505, 49 U.S.C. 55 1301 et seq.
(1970). The words of the 'saving clause' in 49 U.S.C. 5 1506 strengthen this no-
tion.
State jurisdiction is reaffirmed in the legislative history of the 1961 Amend.
ments to the Act-49 U.S.C. § 1472 (a-o)-which specifically deal with federal
crimes aboard aircraft in flight. Congress acknowledged this "[d]oes not preempt
or replace any state jurisdiction . . . [, it] is in addition to the state criminal
law. . . . [T]he Federal government has concurrent jurisdiction with the states."
See 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. at 2564-65 (1961).
110See 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2564-65
(1961) commenting on the 1961 Federal Crimes Aboard Aircraft laws. Congress
recognized state officials were often faced with the insuperable task of establishing
venue for prosecution. Many serious offenses, as a result, have gone unpunished.
The state above which the crime was committed often is not the state in which
the aircraft lands. The landing state sometimes has no jurisdiction to arrest the
suspected criminal. There are the further problems of extradition and the gather-
ing of evidence from passengers-witnesses who invariably disperse.
The practical problems of state jurisdiction, investigation, arrest and indict-
ment prompted the passage of federal legislation to fill the gap. When a crime
also involves violation of federal law, the offender can be taken into custody by
federal law-enforcement agents when the aircraft lands and criminal prosecution
instituted.
"'See, e.g., 38 ILL. STAT. ANN. 55 84-1 et seq. (1970 Supp.) which makes
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B. Federal Jurisdiction and Laws
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as supplemented by pre-
existing selective criminal statutes, provides excellent jurisdictional
and substantive law, not only to proscribe, but also to punish ef-
fectively crimes aboard aircraft in flight within the territorial juris-
diction of the United States. Accordingly, there is a growing body
of federal criminal common law of air crimes with respect to en-
forcement and prosecution. This development is indeed timely; it
is indispensable to the safety and order of air travel and to the con-
fidence of the fare-paying public. Civil aviation is indebted to this
bulwark of federal criminal law since without it "doing business"
in interstate or foreign commerce would suffer irreparable harm.
1. Federal Jurisdiction
The regulations embodied in the Air Commerce Act of 1926.2
and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 193813 were based on the com-
merce power of Congress, not on national sovereign ownership of
airspace.""4 In the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, however, Congress
expressly provided that the federal government possessed and exer-
cised complete and exclusive national sovereignity in the airspace
of the United States, including the airspace above all inland
waters. " ' This ostensibly applied to regulations directed at the intra-
state, interstate or foreign sectors; e.g., rules of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board or Federal Aviation Agency. These administrative
bodies are required to exercise their authority consistent with the
obligations assumed by the United States in any treaty, convention
or agreement with a foreign country.1 "
it unlawful to bring weapons aboard aircraft, or to be in possession of any fire-
arm, explosive or other lethal or dangerous weapon. Moreover, any person pur-
chasing a ticket consents to a search of his person or personal belongings by the
air carrier. The carrier may refuse passage if the searches are objectionable to
the prospective passenger. See also GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3301 (1969 Supp.)
which proscribes the offense of hijacking an aircraft. It further provides a penalty
of death or imprisonment upon conviction.
11Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 569, 48 Stat. 1113.
111 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 979.
11 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization & Assess-
ment, 347 U.S. 590 (1953); Gardner v. Allegheny County, 382 Pa. 2d 88, 114
A.2d 491 (1955).
115 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1108(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1508(a) (1970).
11a Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1102, 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1970). When in
force, such commitments constitute a part of the law of the land, and override
any inconsistent state law or policies. See Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Pan American
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Federal criminal jurisdiction is unquestionably exclusive with
regard to flights outside the territory of the United States even
though federal and state governments share criminal jurisdiction
intrastate vis-a-vis interstate flights.
Section 101 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 contains two
sets of key jurisdictional words: (i) "Air Commerce" means inter-
state, overseas or foreign air commerce, the transportation of mail
by aircraft, any operation or navigation of aircraft within the limits
of any federal airway or any operation or navigation of aircraft
that directly affects, or which may endanger safety in interstate,
overseas or foreign air commerce;... and (ii) "Interstate, Overseas
and Foreign Air Commerce" are defined broadly and mean, in
effect, any flight whose point of origin, departure or scheduled stop
is in the United States, the District of Columbia, a territory or
possession of the United States."' The operative reach of the crim-
inal jurisdiction under these provisions of the 1958 Act is broad
when combined with the section 101 (4) language, "which directly
affects or which may endanger safety in interstate, overseas, and
foreign air commerce" as the latter terms are defined in section
101 (20). This hybrid meaning of "air commerce" makes no dis-
tinction based either on the registry or nationality of an aircraft.
The only criterion is where the aircraft is operating.
Hence, federal laws proscribing crimes aboard aircraft in flight
could apply to two categories of flight: (i) a United States air
carrier or private business aircraft operating anywhere in the world
that originated or intended to terminate its flight in the United
States; and (ii) a foreign air carrier operating anywhere in the
world if it had already made an intermediate stop or was scheduled
to make an intermediate stop in the United States."' The constitu-
Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Garcia v. Pan American Airways,
295 N.Y. 852, 67 N.E.2d 257, 55 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1945), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
741 (1946).
117Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 101(4), 49 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (1970)
(emphasis added).
"'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 101(20), 49 U.S.C. S 1301(20) (1970).
"'See 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2564-68(1961). The history of the House Bill shows the intent of Congress with respect
to the meaning of "air commerce" in connection with the 1961 Federal Crimes
Aboard Aircraft laws.
The term "air commerce" was designedly used because of its broad scope.
It will operate to make certain provisions of these criminal laws applicable not
only to acts committed on American-flag aircraft in "air commerce" over this
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tionality of this kind of extraterritorial effect of federal criminal
law is questionable.12'
2. Crimes Over The High Seas
Congressional reaction to the Cordova case,"' which held that
an aircraft was not a 'vessel' and thus not within admiralty or mari-
time jurisdiction, resulted in legislation enlarging federal jurisdic-
tion.1" The major crimes previously subject to federal jurisdiction
when committed aboard a flag vessel were also made subject to
federal jurisdiction when committed aboard a flag aircraft operating
over the high seas. This was limited jurisdiction, however, since it
applied only when a United States flag aircraft was flying outside
the jurisdiction of a state, over the high seas or over any other
waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United
States.
country or a foreign country, but also to these acts committed on foreign air-
craft in "air commerce" over foreign countries if these aircraft are engaged in
flights originating at or destined for points in the United States. This will permit
the law to protect the large number of American citizens carried by such flights.
The term, "In flight," refers to the airborn part of a flight-the period after
the aircraft leaves the ground on take-off to the touchdown on landing. It does
not apply to acts committed in the aircraft on the ground.
See also Mendelsohn, In-Flight Crime: The International and Domestic Pic-
ture Under the Tokyo Convention, 53 VA. L. REV. 535-45 (1967).
120 United States history and tradition suggest the Supreme Court will be re-
luctant to apply United States criminal statutes extraterritorially. See The Appol-
Ion, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 362, 370 (1824); Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838 (D. Conn.
1925); United States v. Baker, 136 F. Supp. 546, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); 2 HACK-
WORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 179-203 (1941); Sarker, The Proper Law of Crime
in International Law, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 446, 452-56 (1962). See also Brown,
Jurisdiction of United States Courts Over Crimes in Aircraft, 15 STAN. L. REV.
45, 50, 60-61, 74 (1962).
11 United States v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950). Cordova as-
saulted and bit the pilot and a stewardess when they tried to intercede in a quarrel
between Cordova and another passenger. Cordova was subsequently charged with
two counts: assault by striking, wounding, and beating; and simple assault within
the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States. The court held Cor-
dova could not be successfully prosecuted because an aircraft was not a "vessel"
within the "maritime and territorial jurisdiction" of Title 18 § 7. The alleged
crime, therefore, was not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Criminal
jurisdiction of the federal courts is dependent on an act of Congress. The courts
do not exercise common-law criminal jurisdiction.
Accord, Bray v. United States, 289 F. 329 (4th Cir. 1923). Federal courts
have no common law criminal jurisdiction. To confer jurisdiction on federal
courts, federal legislation must specifically enumerate those acts that are offenses
and proscribe their punishment.
122 Crimes: Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States,
18 U.S.C. § 7(5) (1970).
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The crimes codified in Title 18 of the United States Code, are:
assault," maiming, " larceny,122 receiving stolen goods," murder,"'
manslaughter,"' attempts to commit murder or manslaughter,'
rape,"' carnal knowledge".. and robbery. 2 This further enlarged
federal jurisdiction by applying this list of crimes to aircraft in
flight in "air commerce."
3. The 1961 Law: Section 902 Crimes of the Federal Aviation
Act"3
Section 902 of the Act contains a complete listing of all the acts
aboard aircraft that the law makes criminal. A topic categorization
illustrates not only Congress' concern for the safety of the air pas-
senger, but also the peculiarities of air travel itself. The conduct
proscribed includes interference with air navigation, transportation
of explosives and other dangerous articles, aircraft piracy, inter-
ference with flight crew members, crimes aboard aircraft in flight,
carrying weapons aboard aircraft, giving false information, willful
damaging of aircraft, embezzlement and theft.
123 18 U.S.C. § 113 (1970).
" 18 U.S.C. § 114 (1970).
18 U.S.C. § 661 (1970).
128 18 U.S.C. S 662 (1970).
127 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1970).
128 18 U.S.C. 5 1112 (1970).
129 18 U.S.C. § 1113 (1970).
130 18 U.S.C. § 2031 (1970).
131 18 U.S.C. § 2032 (1970).
1- 18 U.S.C. § 2111 (1970).
13 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 902(c), 49 U.S.C. S 1472(c), (h-m)
(1970) [hereinafter cited as THE 1958 ACT]. Section 1472 is the criminal penalty
provision of the Act. It can be divided into two groups:
(i) THE 1958 CRIMES: Subsec.(c)-Interference With Air Navigation; and
subsec. (h) -Transportation of Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles.
(ii) THE 1961 AMENDMENT CRIMES: Subsec.(i)-Aircraft Piracy; Subsec.
(j )-Interference With Flight Crew Members or Flight Attendants;
subsec. (k)-Certain Crimes Aboard Aircraft in Flight [assault, maiming,
larceny, receiving stolen goods, murder, manslaughter, attempts to com-
mit murder or manslaughter, rape, carnal knowledge, robbery, indecent
exposure]; subsec.(1)-Carrying Weapons Aboard Aircraft; and subsec.
(m)-False information [with respect to (i), (j), (k), & (1)].
Several prominent air lawyers early called for legislation in this regard. See,
e.g., Cooper, Crimes Aboard American Aircraft: Under What Jurisdiction Are
They Punishable?, 37 A.B.A.J. 257, 258 (1951). Stiff penalties were intentionally
enacted as a deterrent. Congress realized the offenses, when committed aboard a
highspeed aircraft in flight, could jeopardize the lives of a great many people. 2
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2563-65 (1961).
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Subsection (c) '" proscribes any intentional and knowing inter-
ference with or the making of a false air navigation signal at an
airport, other navigation facility or elsewhere. The penalty is a fine
of up to 5,000 dollars or imprisonment up to five years, or both.
A passenger conceivably could commit this crime aboard an air-
craft in flight.
Subsection (h) of section 902" proscribes the unlawful delivery
to an air carrier, or the transportation in air commerce aboard an
aircraft, of explosives or other dangerous articles. The penalty is a
fine of up to 1,000 dollars or imprisonment up to one year, or both.
When death or bodily injury results, however, the penalty is a fine
of up to 10,000 dollars or imprisonment up to ten years, or both.
Again, a passenger conceivably could commit this crime aboard
an aircraft in flight.
Subsection (i) " proscribes the crime of "aircraft piracy,"
which is specifically defined" ' to mean any seizure or exercise of
control of an aircraft in flight in air commerce138 by force or vio-
lence or threat of force or violence. The penalty is severe: (i) im-
prisonment for not less than twenty years; or (ii) death, if affirm-
atively recommended by a jury verdict or if ordered in the court's
discretion should the defendant either plead guilty or plead not
guilty and waive a jury trial.""
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, $ 902(c), 49 U.S.C. § 1472(c) (1970).
"1 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 902(h), 49 U.S.C. § 1472(h) (1970).
18 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 902(i), 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i) (1970).
137 Congress rejected the proposal that the concept of piracy on the high seas
be applied to air commerce. Congress did, however, use the term "aircraft piracy"
to mean an offense against the law of nations. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS,
87th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2567 (1961) (emphasis added).
18 United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75 (1964) held that the piracy amendment
applied to private as well as to commercial aircraft. In Healy, the respondent
kidnaped the pilot of a private Cessna 172 airplane and forced him to fly from
Florida to Cuba. The district court dismissed the case on the grounds that a pri-
vate plane was not "an aircraft in flight in air commerce" within the meaning of
the air piracy statute; this language was found to apply only to commercial
airlines. The Supreme Court disagreed. In reversing, the Court noted that "[an
aircraft" is on its face an all inclusive term. The Court also decided that the
legislative history indicated only section 902(i) [49 U.S.C. 5 1472(i)], carrying
weapons aboard aircraft, could be limited to commercial air carriers. The other
1961 amendment subsections could apply both to commercial as well as private
aircraft. H.R. Rep. No. 958, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
I,8 Many skyjackers escape arrest by seeking political asylum or refuge in the
landing state. The successful prosecution rate is not high even among those who
are caught or who return to the United States. Many skyjackers are adjudged
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Section 902, Subsection (j)"' proscribes assaults, intimidation
or threats against any flight crew member.. or attendant (including
stewardesses) that interferes with their performance of duties or
lessens their ability to perform their duties."2 The penalty is a fine
of up to 10,000 dollars or imprisonment up to twenty years, or both.
When a deadly or dangerous weapon is used, however, imprison-
ment may be for any term of years up to life.'"2
Subsection (k)'" incorporates by reference all the ten crimes
proscribed by section 7 of Title 18 of the United States Code, and
even adds one more from section 22-1112 of the District of Colum-
bia Code.'" It is parallel legislation to the 1962 law covering crimes
aboard aircraft in flight over the high seas, even though this enact-
ment further enlarges federal jurisdiction by applying the list of
crimes to aircraft in flight in "air commerce."
The purpose of subsection (k) was to provide the umbrella of
federal on-ground and on-seas crimes to flights aboard aircraft in
flight in air commerce. This provides federal jurisdiction concurrent
with state jurisdiction inside the territorial limits of the United
States,' and exclusive federal jurisdiction outside the country. The
insane and others are juveniles. More than half of the piracy indictments have
resulted in acquittal for insanity or indeterminate sentences given juveniles under
the provisions of the Youth Corrections Act. See, e.g., Stephen, "Going South"-
Air Piracy and Unlawful Interference With Air Commerce, 4 INT'L LAW. 433,
437 (1970); N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1971, at 50, col. 1. See also news article note
17 supra, for a listing of conviction rates.
1
4 0 THE 1958 ACT, supra note 133 at § 902(j), 49 U.S.C. § 1472(j).
141 Mims v. United States, 332 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1964) held, on the basis
of the Healy case supra note 138, that this subsection applies to private as well
as commercial aircraft. The court also held that the statutory phrase "flight crew
members" clearly included the pilot.
11 The ability of an aircraft's personnel to function efficiently is vitally im-
portant to the operation of the aircraft and the safety of those aboard. [Legisla-
tive history] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2570
(1961).
14' The heavier penalty for the use of a dangerous weapon is appropriate be-
cause of the special conditions that exist on an aircraft in flight; i.e. the great
potential for injury to aircraft personnel and passengers and to the aircraft itself.
[Legislative history] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., at
2570 (1961).
'THE 1958 ACT note 133 supra at § 902(k)(1), (2).
"
4 D.C. CODE ANN. 22-1112 (1970).
146 In-flight crimes normally involve acts that are offenses under state law,
but the difficulties of prosecution under state law make it desirable to provide for
concurrent jurisdiction under federal law. [Legislative history] 2 U.S. CODE CONO.
& AD. NEWS, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2571 (1961).
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crimes are: assault, " maiming, "' embezzlement and theft, "  re-
ceiving stolen property,15  murder,"' manslaughter, 15 ' attempt to
commit murder or manslaughter," rape,1"' carnal knowledge of a
147 18 U.S.C. § 113 (1970). Assault is punishable as follows: (i) with intent
to commit murder or rape, by imprisonment up to twenty years (ii) with intent
to commit any other felony, by a fine of up to $3,000 or imprisonment up to ten
years, or both (iii) with a dangerous weapon without just cause or excuse and
intending to do bodily harm, by a fine of up to $1,000 or imprisonment up to
five years, or both (iv) striking, beating, or wounding, by a fine up to $500 and
imprisonment up to six months, or both (v) simple assault, by a fine up to $300
or imprisonment up to three months, or both.
'- 18 U.S.C. S 114 (1970). Maiming occurs when one intentionally does any
of the following acts to another person: maims; disfigures; cuts; bites; slits the
nose, ear or lip; cuts out or disables the tongue; puts out or destroys an eye; cuts
off or disables a limb or any other member; and throws or pours upon another
scalding water, corrosive acid or caustic substances. The crime is punishable by
a fine of up to $1,000 or imprisonment up to seven years, or both.
149 18 U.S.C. § 661 (1970). Embezzlement and theft occur when one inten-
tionally takes away the personal property of another. The crime is punishable
according to the value or kind of property taken: (i) Over $100, or any value
if actually taken from the person of another, by a fine of up to $5,000 or im-
prisonment up to five years, or both; (ii) All other cases, by a fine of up to
$1,000 or imprisonment up to one year, or both; (iii) Allows recovery of the
face amount due or secured by any written instrument or evidence of indebted-
ness so taken.
See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1969, at 75, col. 3. A gunman robbed a pas-
senger during a hijacking to Cuba.
"'o 18 U.S.C. § 662 (1970). Receiving Stolen Property occurs when one know-
ingly buys, receives, or conceals any money, goods, bank notes, or other things
that may have been stolen or embezzled. The crime is punishable according to
the value of the property taken: (i) Over $100, by a fine of up to $1,000 or im-
prisonment up to three years, or both; (ii) Less than $100, by a fine of up to
$1,000 or imprisonment up to one year, or both.
15 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1970). Murder is defined as the unlawful killing of a
human being with malice aforethought.
(i) First Degree Murder is a willful, deliberate, malicious, premeditated kil-
ling, or if done with poison, or if a felony-murder done in connection
with arson, rape, burglary, or robbery. The penalty is death, or life
imprisonment if qualified by a jury verdict.
(ii) Second Degree Murder includes all other killings. The penalty is impri-
sonment up to life.
12 18 U.S.C. § 1112 (1970). Manslaughter constitutes the unlawful killing of
a human being without malice.
(i) Voluntary Manslaughter occurs in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
The penalty is imprisonment up to ten years.
(ii) Involuntary Manslaughter occurs in any other circumstance. The penalty
is a fine of up to $1,000 or imprisonment up to three years, or both.
15 18 U.S.C. § 1113 (1970). Attempt to Commit Murder or Manslaughter
punishable by a fine of up to $1,000 or imprisonment up to three years, or both.
" 18 U.S.C. § 2031 (1970). Rape is punishable by death or imprisonment
up to life.
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female under 16-years,'5 robbery and burglary," and indecent ex-
posure.'57
Subsection (1) of the 1961 Act5 8 proscribes the carrying or
possession of a concealed,"' deadly or dangerous weapon by anyone
who attempts to board an aircraft (or while aboard an aircraft)
being operated by an air carrier in air transportation.' The penalty
is a fine of up to 1,000 dollars or imprisonment up to one year, or
both."' There are two general categories of exceptions that allow
certain persons to carry arms: (i) law enforcement officers (mu-
'. 18 U.S.C. S 2032 (1970). Carnal Knowledge of a Female Under Sixteen-
Years Old occurs whenever one carnally knows (sexual intercourse) any female,
not his wife, under sixteen years of age. The first offense is punishable by im-
prisonment up to fifteen years, a subsequent offense by imprisonment up to thirty
years.
156 18 U.S.C. § 2111 (1970). Robbery and Burglary occur when anything
of value is taken (larceny) from a person, or from his presence, by force, vio-
lence, or intimidation. The crime is punishable by imprisonment up to fifteen
years.
" 11 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1112 (1970). Indecent Exposure occurs when
one person makes any obscene or indecent exposure of his body to another per-
son; or makes any lewd, obscene or indecent sexual proposal; or commits any
other lewd, obscene or indecent act. The crime is punishable for each offense by
a fine of up to $300 or imprisonment up to ninety days, or both; however, there
is a fine of up to $1,000 or imprisonment up to one year, or both, if done in the
presence of a person under the age of sixteen years old.
" THE 1958 ACT, at § 902(i)(1).
""Included in this subsection is a weapon in a bag or other container the
passenger is holding, or which will be readily accessible to him once on the air-
craft. This does not include a weapon in a piece of luggage not accessible to the
passenger during the flight. [Legislative history] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS,
87th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2575 (1961).
""The term applies to aircraft being used in commercial operations both
while "in flight" and while "not in flight". [Legislative history] 2 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2552 (1961).
... United States v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 415 (W.D. Tex. 1969) (emphasis
added) held there was an unlawful attempt to board an aircraft while carrying a
concealed pistol. The passenger surrendered his ticket at the Braniff customer
service agent's desk and entered the departure lounge for the flight covered by
the ticket. The court delineated the standard for determining attempt: when an
effort to commit a crime has gone past mere preparation and planning which if
not stopped would result in the full consummation of the act. Another passenger
tipped-off a security guard at the San Antonio International Airport. The guard
questioned the accused, and removed the pistol. The court held that the custodial-
accusatory stage attached requiring the giving of the Miranda warning which the
guard failed to do. See Note, Criminal Law-Concealed Weapon-Attempt To
Board Aircraft, 36 J. AIR L. & COM. 370 (1970).
Accord, United States v. Zorrilla, 9 Avi. 17,305 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) held that
a ticketed passenger's delivery of his baggage to the air carrier, and his wait at
the boarding gate while in possession of a pistol constituted an attempt to board
the aircraft while carrying a concealed weapon.
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nicipal, state and federal) if authorized to carry weapons; and (ii)
any other person authorized to carry arms pursuant to a regulation
issued by the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
Subsection (m)'. proscribes the giving of false information."
concerning an attempt or alleged attempt to commit a crime pro-
hibited by subsections (i), (j), (k) or (1) of section 902. To do so
knowingly subjects the offender to a fine of 1,000 dollars or im-
prisonment up to one year, or both. To do so willfully and ma-
liciously or with reckless disregard for the safety of human life
subjects the offender to a fine of up to 5,000 dollars or imprison-
ment up to five years, or both.
4. Willful Damaging of Aircraft
An act separate from section 901'" makes it unlawful for anyone
intentionally and willfully to set fire to, damage, destroy, disable or
wreck any civil aircraft, aircraft part, air cargo or air navigation
facility relating to interstate, overseas or foreign air commerce. In
addition, it is unlawful to incapacitate any crew member.
An attempt subjects the offender to a fine of up to 10,000 dol-
lars or imprisonment up to twenty years, or both. If someone is
killed as a result of any of these unlawful acts, the death penalty
may be imposed if affirmatively recommended by a jury verdict or
if so ordered in the court's discretion should the defendant either
plead guilty or plead not guilty and waive a jury trial.'
5. Embezzlement and Theft
Another separate act'66 makes it a crime to embezzle, steal or
unlawfully take: (i) an aircraft operated by any common carrier
6
' TIE 1958 ACT at § 902(m).
163 The subsection was written into law to deter false reports of information
concerning such crimes in view of the wide publicity given skyjackings and bomb-
ings of aircraft. [Legislative history] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 2575 (1961).
'Act of July 14, 1956, 18 U.S.C. §§ 31-35 (1970). See Havelock v. United
States, 427 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1970). This case involved arson aboard an air-
craft in flight; a fire was set to materials in a restroom.
Skyjackers who threaten to discharge explosives in order to coerce the pilot
are in violation of the "Bomb Hoax" statute, 18 U.S.C. § 35 (1970). See Carlson
v. United States, 296 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1961); Comment, Criminal Law-Avia-
tion-Bomb Hoax, 30 J. AIR L. & CoM. 390 (1964). See also 18 U.S.C. § 34
(1970); 15 U.S.C. § 1281 (1970).
" See Epperson case, note 1 supra.
161 Act of June 25, 1948, 18 U.S.C. §§ 659, 660 (1970).
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moving in interstate or foreign commerce; or (ii) any money,
baggage, goods or chattel whatsover from a passenger. The act
also makes it unlawful to receive this stolen or embezzled property
knowlingly. The crime is punishable according to the value of the
property taken: (i) over 100 dollars by a fine up to 5,000 dollars
or imprisonment up to ten years, or both; and (ii) less than 100
dollars by a fine up to 1,000 dollars or imprisonment up to one
year, or both.
These provisions should be considered supplementary to the
parallel provisions in section 902 of the Federal Aviation Act; i.e.,
supplementary to subsection 902(i), air piracy, and subsection
902(k), regarding embezzlement, theft and receiving stolen prop-
erty.
C. Investigation and Enforcement
1. FBI Investigations
Section 902(n) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.. simply
provides that violations of subsections (i) through (m) shall be
investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Depart-
ment of Justice because the FBI has personnel especially trained in
the detection of crime and apprehension of criminals. This is an
adjunct to the investigatory authority already vested in the Federal
Aviation Agency and the Civil Aeronautics Board, both of which
are usually limited to civil and regulatory investigations."8
2. Venue of Criminal Prosecutions
Section 903 (a) of the 1958 Act provides for venue to be in the
district where the offense was committed.... If the commission of an
offense is begun in one district and completed in another, then the
accused may be tried in any of the districts where the crime was
begun, continued or completed.
On the other hand, when a crime is committed beyond the juris-
diction of a particular state or district (e.g., outside the territorial
limits of the United States), the offender may be tried in the district
in which he or one of his accomplices is arrested or first brought
before a magistrate.
If the suspects are not arrested or brought into any district, an
167 THaE 1958 AcT at § 902(n).
168 [Legislative history] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 2576 (1961).
leg Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. 5 1473(a) (1970).
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indictment or information may be filed in the district of last known
residence of one of the offenders, or if residence is unknown, in the
District of Columbia. This prevents the running of the statute of
limitations applicable to an offense committed outside the United
States when the offender remains abroad.'
D. The Constitutionality of Preboard Screening
The primary method for combating the threat of skyjacking is
the preboard screening system developed by the FAA. This screen-
ing system is composed of a hijacker behavioral profile coupled
with a magnetometer weapons detection device. 7' The hijacker
behavioral profile is a psychological profile of hijacker identification
characteristics compiled from actual case studies of skyjackers
performed by Dr. John Dailey, the chief of the FAA's psychology
staff.'' The magnetometer weapons detection device is a unique
weapons detector employing two aluminum pole sensors-one on
each side of a boarding gate-connected to a read-out instrument.
The device measures deviations in a magnetic field and is calibrated
to discriminate between different types of weapons such as guns
and knives."' Airlines are now required by law to use this anti-
hijack system."' The system is being credited with success... and
' In the case of a capital offense, an indictment may be filed at any time,
without limitation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (1970). In the case of lesser offenses,
however, the indictment or information must be filed within five years after the
offense is committed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1970).
See also 18 U.S.C. § 3290 (1970); McGowen v. United States, 105 F.2d 791
(D.C. Cir. 1930). Once a person becomes a fugitive from justice, the statute of
limitations will no longer run. A fugitive, therefore, will never gain immunity.
Contra, United States v. Parrino, 180 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1950).
71'See LIFE, Aug. 11, 1972, at 30; U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 31,
1972, at 33-34.
'72 See note 29 supra.
17'Schultz, How The Airlines Hope To Stop The Hijackers, POPuLAR ME-
CHANICS, May 1970, at 83-85.
The magnetometer measures disturbances (or deviations) in the earth's mag-
netic field caused when ferrous-metal objects pass nearby. FAA engineers have
determined the degree of magnetic field disturbances created by weapons of dif-
ferent sizes. Metal emits a force proportional to its mass. Disturbances created by
a gun are greater than those created by a knife, or even keys.
Of course, this device would be of questionable use to detect zip guns made
primarily of wood, plastic explosives, and vials of acid or nitroglycerine. Tooth-
man, Legal Problems Of Skyjacking, [1969] A.B.A. SECT. INS. N.&C.L. 251,257
(1969).
174 See Security Rules.
'71 According to the June 1972 FAA report, 170,078 persons underwent spe-
cial security checks because they appeared to fit the hijacker profile; 453 were
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passengers even seem to approve these increased security measures
in spite of obvious inconveniences.""
1. Applicability of the Fourth Amendment
The United States Constitution "7 prohibits "unreasonable"
searches and seizures; that is, those not incident to a lawful arrest
or not authorized by a search warrant."' In addition, the Supreme
Court has held that the fourth amendment prohibits the fruits of an
illegal search and seizure from being introduced and used against
a defendant. This constitutional protection is enforced against both
federal and state governments. 9 Query, whether the scan by a
denied boarding either because they could not properly identify themselves or
were guilty of some law violation. Of this group, 148 were arrested-16 for vari-
ous phases of air piracy, 60 on narcotics charges, 14 for possession of handguns,
4 for being fugitives from other jurisdictions, and 54 for immigration violations
and other offenses. The Spokesman-Review, Aug. 14, 1972, at 9, col. 3.
FBI and FAA officials claim successful skyjackings are on the decline. In the
first four months of 1972, 626 persons were arrested-14 while aboard aircraft.
Nearly 8,000 weapons of all kinds were confiscated, many of them found around
terminals-presumably discarded by scared-off skyjackers. U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, July 3, 1972, at 13; LIFE, Aug. 11, 1972, at 30; U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Apr. 24, 1972, at 23.
176 See interviews with selected airline officials, P. Bird, Hijacking Revisited,
May 1972 (unpublished paper in SMU Law School Library) at 27-28, 31-32.
".. U.S. CONST. amend. IV guarantees: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
See generally, Comment, Consent Searches-Relinquishment Of Fourth
Amendment Rights-The Need For A Warning, 5 GONZAGA L. REV. 315-23
(1970); Comment, Constitutional Standards For Stop And Frisk: Guidelines And
Implementation, 5 CAL. W. L. REV. 265-86 (1969); Comment, The Expanding
Power Of Police To Search And Seize: Effect Of Recent U.S. Supreme Court De-
cisions On Criminal Investigation, 40 U. CAL. L. REV. 491-508 (1968); Comment,
The Need For A Warning Prior To A Waiver Of The Fourth Amendment, 10
SANTA CLARA LAW. 205-21 (1969); Note, Delivery Of Container To Airline For
Shipment Does Not Create Exigent Circumstances Permitting Search Without
Warrant, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 332-40 (1970); Note, Is Electronic Surveillance
By Bugged Agents A Search And Seizure Within The Fourth Amendment?, 14
VILL. L. REV. 758-64 (1969).
178 A search may be made without a warrant if it is incident to an arrest and
is limited to the area under the immediate control of the accused. Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The Constitution does not forbid searches and
seizures unless they are "unreasonable." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
222 (1960).
179 The "exclusionary" rule of evidence was first enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). This rule was made appli-
cable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
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magnetometer is a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment? It emits no energy like an X-ray. Also, it is a passive measur-
ing instrument and only registers a magnetic deviation caused by
the metal objects the passenger carries. The question may now be
moot since the Fourth Circuit recently held the magnetometer scan
to be a "search" in the constitutional sense. 8 ' Other circuit courts,
however, may not agree.
Because the fourth amendment protection does not apply to the
conduct of private individuals, evidence illegally seized by private
persons is admissable against a defendant.'8' Thus, on its face the
preboard search by the airlines would presumably be free from
constitutional constraints. The government, however, is intimately
involved in the preboard screening program through the FAA. For
example, the FAA has furnished the technology and the training
for the security systems and sky-marshals work alongside airline
personnel. There is more than close cooperation between the gov-
ernment and the airlines on the anti-hijack program; it is a highly
coordinated and integrated enterprise. This connection is so close
that for purposes of preboard screening the airlines are arguably
acting as agents of the police aiding in the enforcement of federal
law.""2 The entire preboard screening program, then, is presumably
subject to constitutional scrutiny.
in the case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The rule, therefore, applies
to governmental action be it state or federal.
"I The court found there was no difference between a search done electronical-
ly and one done physically by a frisk: "[I]t is still a search. Indeed, that is the
sole purpose and function of a magnetometer: to search for metal and disclose
its presence in areas where there is a normal expectation of privacy." United
States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972). See also United States
v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1092 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). "In effect the system itself,
communicating through the airline, acts as an informer providing information
leading to interview and search. [T]he informant is an objective system, not an
individual ...." Cf. United States v. Bigos, 459 F.2d 639, 641-42 (5th Cir. 1972).
But see United States v. Millen, 338 F. Supp. 747, 753 (E.D. Wisc. 1972):
"[A]n examination by law enforcement agents of a person's hands under a floure-
scent light while he is in custody does not constitute a search subject to Fourth
Amendment constraints (emphasis added)."
"I' Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Watson v. United States, 391
F.2d 927 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 985 (1968); United States v. Gold-
berg, 330 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1964).
1 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1092 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
"In the case before us the testimony indicated that the airlines personnel at the
boarding area act in close conjunction with the U.S. Marshals in a combined
effort to thwart potential hijackers. While the Marshals ultimately perform the
19731
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The Supreme Court has established a high standard for non-
participatory electronic surveillance.'" In announcing a test to de-
termine whether electronic surveillance is an unlawful search and
seizure, the Court rejected the earlier requirement that there be a
physical trespass of the person or his environment in favor of
whether the questioned conduct "violated the privacy upon which
the person justifiably relied.'" An electronic search is constitutional
only if it does not violate this standard of personal privacy-a
standard necessarily defined on a case by case basis. The Court, on
the other hand, has said a "stop and frisk" is reasonable and com-
ports with fourth amendment safeguards if the police officer was
able "to point to specific and articulable facts which reasonably
warrant an inference of criminal behavior..'. An unparticularized
suspicion or "hunch" is not enough. The officer is entitled to draw
an inference of criminal behavior only from specific facts in light
of his experience. This constitutionally validates the "stop." Even
then the scope of the "frisk" must be limited to a pat-down of the
outside of the suspect's clothing. An entry of the clothing is not
permitted unless an object is discovered that is believed to be a
weapon or gives probable cause to arrest.
2. Passenger Screening
Two federal district courts188 and the Fourth Circuit18 ' have held
the preboard screening system developed by the FAA to be constitu-
tional. These decisions have clarified some of the more important
issues and have provided guidelines for the airline industry and
'frisk' it is the airline employees who have primary responsibility for applying
the profile and designating 'selectees'."
183Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The eavesdropping was done
by means of an electronic listening device attached to the outside of a telephone
booth.
184 Id.
85 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The "reasonableness" of a stop is de-
termined by balancing the interests of society in investigating possible criminal
behavior against the intrusion of the individual's privacy. The interest which
justifies the pat-down is not that of society, but that of protecting the officer dur-
ing the stop-he may frisk to minimize the threat of physical harm to himself.
Accord, Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
188 United States v. Bell, 335 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) [hereinafter cited
Bell]; United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) [hereinafter
cited Lopez]. Lopez was the first preboard screening case; it is a thorough, even
exhaustive, treatment of the subject.
187 United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972) [hereinafter cited
Epperson].
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other courts to follow. Further refinements and developments in
the law, however, should be expected as other district and circuit
courts deal with the problem. The Supreme Court may not need to
consider the problem188 if these decisions continue to show uni-
formity.
The screening system administered by the airlines uses several
techniques that collectively reduce the number of passengers who
may have to submit to a "stop and frisk""' by a Deputy United
States Marshall-an eventuality to which all passengers are alerted
by large signs,' both in English and Spanish, prominently dis-
played in boarding areas. The airlines, of course, must be very
careful not to detain or humiliate the passenger unnecessarily.'
This presumably also applies to federal marshals.
The basic elements of the passenger screening system, and the
typical routine followed in its application,' may be outlined as
follows:
188 Each is well grounded upon respectable Supreme Court and circuit court
"search and seizure" cases. See, e.g., citations, notes 185 & 186, supra.
" See Bell, note 186 supra at 802. "Had the decision to stop and frisk been
made solely on the basis of activating the device [about 50% of the passengers
trigger its magnetic field], the court might have reached a different result. But
the magnetometer is only one of a series of screening procedures ...." See also
Lopez, note 186 supra at 100. "[T]he use of the magnetometer might be an ob-
jectionable intrusion were it not accompanied by an antecedent warning from the
profile indicating a need to focus particular attention on the subject."
I" The signs inform passengers that they and their baggage are subject to
electronic or physical search for weapons; the signs also warn passengers of the
mandatory minimum 20-year prison sentence and the maximum sentence of death
for air piracy. The courts have not accepted the argument that this constitutes
an "implied consent" on the part of the passenger for a subsequent "search and
seizure." See Lopez, note 186 supra at 1092. Consent to a search involves a re-
linquishment of fundamental constitutional rights; to be valid, the consent must be
unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given. See, e.g., United States v. Smith,
308 F.2d 657, 663 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 906 (1963); Channel
v. United States, 285 F.2d 217, 219-20 (9th Cir. 1960). The mere reading of these
signs, the Lopez court felt, did not effect such a waiver.
See, e.g., Delta Airlines v. Porter, 70 Ga. 152, 27 S.E.2d 758 (Ga. C.A.
1943). In this case, the passenger was wrongfully ejected from the plane. He was
not allowed to re-board after an intermediate stop even though traveling on a
through ticket. The court said this was a technical battery: wrongful interference
with contract rights. The passenger was not required to physically resist, but had
a right to yield to authority and throw himself on the law as his remedy. The
passenger recovered actual compensatory damages for the breach of contract of
carriage. He was also awarded consequential damages for injury to feeling, suf-
fering, humiliation, emabarrassment, and inconvenience. Moreover, punitive dam-
ages were awarded to deter the airline's highhanded and wrongful conduct.
19' See Lopez, note 186 supra at 1082-85.
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(i) Behavioral Profile. At the ticket counter the passenger is
visually compared with the skyjacker identification characteristics
of the psychological-behavioral profile.193 If there is a match, then
that passenger becomes a "selectee" and is focused on by airline
employees. The airlines must "scrupulously [apply] the [FAA de-
veloped] profile without any additions or subtractions" '' in view of
the "disquieting implications of the system..". This preserves its
judicially approved "essential neutrality and objectivity" and pre-
vents violation of the traditional equal protection standards."'
"'The Lopez court permitted only an in camera disclosure, excluding from
the courtroom the public and the defendant, when it took testimony which re-
vealed the specific characteristics included in the profile. The court did this be-
cause "were even one characteristic of the 'profile' generally revealed, the sys-
tem could be seriously undermined .... " The defendant, a narcotic addict and
suspected dealer, "would feel no compunction about telling what he knew to all
who would lend an ear in prison or out." Id. at 1086. The Fifth Amendment
guarantee of a public trial was not impinged, according to Judge Weinstein, be-
cause "the danger in revealing the profile is so great as to warrant the public's
exclusion for a limited period." Id. at 1088. Moreover, the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of the right to counsel was held not offended since defense counsel was
present throughout the testimony and cross-examined the witnesses thoroughly.
"Adversarial advocacy" was preserved. Id. at 1088, 1091. The court went on to
draw an analogy to the "informer" line of cases which permit just such an in
camera examination. Id. at 1090-92.
14 See Bell, note 186 supra at 801.
"See Lopez, note 186 supra at 1100. "Employing a combination of psy-
chological, sociological, and physical sciences to screen, inspect and categorize
unsuspecting citizens raises visions of abuse in our increasingly technological
society." The court went on to say: "[O]ur criminal law is based on the theory
that we do not condemn people because they are potentially dangerous. We only
prosecute illegal acts."
1" Id. at 1086-87, 1101. "Those characteristics selected [by the original 1969
FAA task force and continuously updated since as new hijackings occur] can
be easily observed without exercising judgment. They do not discriminate against
any group on the basis of religion, origin, political views, or race. They are pre-
cisely designed to select only those who present a high probability of being dan-
gerous."
The airline in Lopez, however, made a critical error. It departed from strict
adherence to the approved FAA behavioral profile by eliminating one of its
"fundamental characteristics" and by adding two others, one of which "introduced
an ethnic element for which there was no experimental basis" and another "added
criterion [which] called for an act of individual judgment on the part of the air-
line employee." The effect of these changes, the court found, was "to destroy the
essential neutrality and objectivity of the approved profile." The court concluded:
"The approved system survives constitutional scrutiny only by its careful adher-
ence to absolute objectivity and neutrality. When elements of discretion and pre-
judice are interjected it becomes constitutionally impermissible." The court re-
fused to admit into evidence the fruits of this unconstitutional seizure, saying
that "while the abuse . . . was by airline officials, not the government, these
employees were acting as government agents insofar as they designated 'selectees'
and alerted Marshals."
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(ii) Magnetometer Scan. A "selectee" is carefully monitored
when he undergoes the magnetometer scan. Should it register the
presence of metal objects the size of weapons,"" the passenger is
stopped and questioned by airline security personnel. The "selectee"
is asked to produce identification and then asked whether he is
carrying any concealed weapons. Satisfactory identification and
answers usually result in the passenger being allowed to board the
aircraft.
The reasonableness of the magnetometer "search" was recently
affirmed by the Fourth Circuit employing the "balancing" test used
by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio,"' i.e., balancing the gov-
ernmental interest in searching against the invasion of privacy to
the individual. The Fourth Circuit stated: "We think the search
for the sole purpose of discovering weapons and preventing air
piracy, and not for the purpose of discovering weapons and pre-
criminal events, fully justified the minimal invasion of personal
privacy by the magnetometer.' '.. The court went on to say: "The
danger is so well known, the government interest so overwhelming,
and the invasion of privacy so minimal, that the warrant require-
ment is excused by exigent national circumstances.""' Finally, the
court concluded:
It is clear to us that to innocent passengers the use of a magne-
tometer to detect metal on those boarding an aircraft is not a
resented intrusion on privacy, but, instead, a welcome reassurance
of safety. Such a search is more than reasonable; it is a compelling
necessity to protect essential air commerce and the lives of pas-
sengers."'
(iii) Stop and Frisk. A federal deputy marshal is summoned"'
if the "selectee" fails to identify himself satisfactorily or explain
the presence of weapon-sized metal objects on this person. The
"' See note 173 supra, and accompanying text. See also Bell, note 186 supra
at 802.
8 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See discussion, note 185 supra. See also United States
v. Davis, 459 F.2d 458, 459 (9th Cir. 1972) for an example of an unjustified
police stop violating the Terry v. Ohio "balancing" test.
"'Epperson, note 187 supra at 771.
200 Id. To require a search warrant as a prerequisite to the use of a magne-
tometer, the court believed, would exalt form over substance.
21 Id. at 772.
"' See Lopez, note 186 supra at 1083.
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marshal again requests identification and typically asks the person
to go through the magnetometer once more. Should this fail to
resolve things, the passenger is then asked to submit to a voluntary
search."3 The marshal pats-down the external clothing to discover
if the suspect is carrying any concealed weapons. Depending on
what is found, boarding is permitted or the person is detained. All
this is done out of view of the general public.
Preboard "stop and frisks" likewise have been judicially approved
as constitutional, again principally on the basis of Terry v. Ohio.2"
The Fourth Circuit found this kind of search to be reasonable under
the fourth amendment "since the use of the magnetometer was
justified at its inception, and since the subsequent physical frisk
was justified by the information developed by the magnetometer,
and since the search was limited in scope solely to a search for wea-
pons . . .. ""' There is, in effect, a cumulative development of prob-
able cause: initially from the behavioral profile, and secondly from
the magnetometer. The quantum of suspicion rises even further on
failure of the passenger to identify himself adequately or to answer
questions about carrying concealed weapons. There is then sub-
stantive probable cause to make a physical search. The Fourth
Circuit additionally found that "the deputy marshal was advancing
a serious government interest-the prevention of air piracy, a crime
normally committed with a dangerous weapon that could poten-
tially cause death or serious injury to many innocent bystanders. 20 6
Whatever evidence is ultimately seized during preboard screen-
ing, (e.g., weapons, contraband or narcotics), of course, may be
203 The Bell court, note 186 supra at 803, upheld the "stop and frisk" on the
ground that the search was one for weapons; e.g., where a reasonably prudent
officer has reason to believe the person to be searched is armed and dangerous,
and that the officer's safety or the safety of others is endangered. The court did
not try to uphold it as a "consent" search even though the defendant admittedly
said "sure" to a deputy marshal's request to make a custodial frisk. See note 172
supra for a discussion of the high standard which must be met to support a
"consent" search.
204 See note 198 supra.
" Epperson, note 187 supra at 172. Accord, Bell, note 186 supra at 803.210 Epperson, note 187 supra at 772. "Here," continued the court, "the search
was conducted because an objective system used to detect air pirates had indi-
cated that the defendant was one of a class of less than 1 % of all air passengers;
i.e., a potentially armed and dangerous air pirate (citing Lopez at 1084, 1097).
Furthermore, of that select group, almost 6% of those actually frisked were
found to have a weapon. On balance then, the court finds the intrusion into the
defendant's person by the frisk search for weapons justifiable and constitutional."
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introduced at trial against the defendant as the "fruits" of a con-
stitutional search.20 '
3. Baggage Screening
The mandate against unreasonable searches and seizures also
applies to the inspection of passenger luggage."8 The rule is well-
established: Airlines, in their "private capacity,""20 may constitu-
tionally search a person's luggage without a warrant solely for
safety reasons or to discover possible tariff violations. 1 ° The courts,
however, have not permitted baggage inspections conducted in re-
sponse to police suggestion when the only purpose is to discover
contraband (e.g., narcotics) bearing no relation to aircraft safety
and security. 1' This presumably is still the law. The new FAA
" See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See also note 158
supra.
208 See note 177 supra.
29 See note 181 supra.
2
' The suspicion of an airline employee caused him to hold a passenger's
suitcase at the airport after the flight left. The employee unlocked the suitcase and
found watch movements. He reported this to customs officers who took possession
of the suitcase. The customs officers later arrested the passenger for receiving
unlawfully imported watch movements. The court held the watch movements
were admissible into evidence. The airline had acted within its private capacity;
there had been no "search" within the constitutional meaning of the term. Wolf
Low v. United States, 391 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849
(1968).
See also Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967); United States
v. Burton, 341 F. Supp. 302 (W.D. Mo. 1972). The court, in the latter case, ob-
served: "Mr. Webster [airline employee] was serving the purpose of his employer
in investigating a suitcase which he, relying on his twenty-five years of experience
and the recently developed behavioral pattern profiles, believed to contain un-
usual and perhaps dangerous articles. . . .Certainly the airline had a respons-
ibility for the protection of the lives and safety of these passengers, and an in-
terest in protecting its financial investment in the plane and equipment ...
[T]he search ... was not so connected with government participation or influence
as to be characterized as a federal search cast in the form of carrier inspection,
but rather the search was an independent investigation by the carrier for its own
purposes." Id. at 306.
211 See Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966). The initial
search of packages by the airline employee was in the presence of and at the
specific request of government agents. The court characterized this as a govern-
ment search. The fruits of this unlawful search were inadmissible.
See also People v. McGrew, 1 Cal. 3d 404, 462 P.2d 1, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473
(1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 909 (1971). McGrew left a locked footlocker
with United Airlines freight office to be shipped. Police had earlier cautioned
the airlines to be on the alert for footlockers and suspicious looking hippie types
who might try to ship marijuana this way. The freight agent broke into McGrew's
footlocker and found some packages. The packages were turned over to state
narcotics agents who determined they contained marijuana. The California Su-
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regulations requiring baggage searches make the situation a par-
ticularly sensitive one for the airlines. If they are not careful, the
fruits of these searches may be inadmissible. The passenger, in the
proper fact situation, could raise a good constitutional defense:
Airline personnel acted ostensibly as government agents for police
purposes without a search warrant and conducted a preboard bag-
gage search unrelated to airline safety or security.
To further protect themselves, the air carriers will probably want
to file amended tariffs1' with the Civil Aeronautics Board seeking
approval to search passenger carry-on and stow-away baggage for
"weapons and explosives or other objects which may be inimical
to safety or security of flight...... These qualifying words are highly
important; they key on a legitimate airline interest. The CAB,
under the filed tariff doctrine,"' has the authority to approve the
preme Court held that the initial search by the airline employee was conducted
solely for police purposes and in response to police suggestion. The court said:
(i) There was no consent to the search because the tariff provision granting
the right was not spelled out on the freight document, but only incorpo-
rated by reference. One can contract to permit a search provided it is
knowing and intentional. Stoner v, California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Zap
v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1945); Cipes v. United States, 343 F.2d
95 (9th Cir. 1965).
(ii) The airline had implied consent to inspect only for airline purposes; e.g.,
for aircraft safety or tariff rate violations. A search for contraband was
totally unrelated to the interests of the airlines. Exigent circumstances
sufficient to permit a search without a warrant did not exist.
212 See Security Rules.
21 All of the airlines have the tariff right to refuse to carry passengers who
will not consent to be searched. Tariff 6(A) reads, in part: "Carrier will refuse
to transport or will remove at any point, any passenger who refuses to permit
search of his person or property for concealed, deadly or dangerous weapons."
See Rule 6(A)(3)(a) & (b), Local and Joint Pasesnger Rules Tariff No. PR-5,
C.A.B. No. 117 (Oct. 27, 1968).
The CAB notified the FAA in March of 1969, that the following provision
was added to the Eastern Air Lines tariff: "Passengers and baggage are subject
to inspection with an electronic detector with or without passengers' consent
or knowledge." FAA Memorandum, CC-I (Mar. 21, 1969).
14 See note 47 supra.
"'1Tariffs filed with and approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
become part of the contract of carriage between the airline and the passenger.
49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1970). The CAB, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
determines in the first instance the "reasonableness" of tariffs. This is within its
regulatory authority as delegated by Congress, and within the exercise of its ad-
ministrative expertise. The provisions of an approved tariff are deemed valid
until rejected by the CAB. Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d
Cir. 1951). Filed tariffs are binding on the passenger despite lack of knowledge
or assent. Tannenbaum v. National Airlines, Inc., 176 N.Y.S.2d 400 (N.Y. Sup.
1958). For example: Noncompliance with an airline traiff requiring filing of a
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"reasonableness" of all the terms and conditions relating to air
carriage. This includes inspection of passenger baggage. Approved
tariff provisions, of course, become part of the contract of carriage
between the airlines and their passengers. The air carrier protec-
tively can get CAB tariff approval to conduct preboard baggage
searches whether or not the passenger has knowledge or consents
to the search. The inherent danger and risk in skyjacking provides
ample public policy and police power reasons to allow this type of
preboard screening. Exigent circumstances exist.
IV. CONCLUSION
Skyjacking has become a problem of international dimensions.
Its genesis lies in the peculiar admixture of cold war politics with
the unique technology of commercial jet travel. A skyjack mani-
fests a multitude of complicated personal and political frustrations
that are actualized when an aircraft is unlawfully seized. The jet
aircraft in flight is externally a symbol of prestige and prowess;
internally it is vulnerable. The skyjacker ostensibly acts against
pilots and crew; but the primary and effectual coercion is always
against the lives and safety of the passengers. The economic life-
blood of commercial civil aviation are passengers. Without them,
airlines would be out of business. Skyjacks threaten this basic eco-
nomic condition.
Crimes aboard aircraft are now legally proscribed. Federal and
state governments may share jurisdiction intrastate, but it is federal
criminal law that is exclusive for interstate and foreign flights. The
list of federal crimes aboard aircraft in flight is comprehensive:
assault, maiming, larceny, receiving stolen goods, robbery, em-
bezzlement, theft, murder, manslaughter, rape, indecent exposure,
carnal knowledge of a female under sixteen years of age, carrying
weapons aboard aircraft, air piracy, interference with flight crew
members, transportation of explosives and willful damaging of
aircraft. Civil aviation in general, and the fare-paying public in
particular, are the real beneficiaries of these laws.
Laws alone, however, are not enough to stop skyjackers. The
federal government and the airlines, therefore, have jointly under-
claim for lost baggage within thirty days bars recovery by the passenger. Migoski
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 63 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1953).
See also notes 84-86 supra.
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taken a comprehensive anti-hijack program. Both industry and
government closely cooperate with each other. The program is
highly integrated. The airlines use both the preboard screening
techniques employing the FAA-developed skyjacker behavioral
profile and the magnetometer weapons-detector. The federal gov-
ernment uses deputy marshals at boarding stations to conduct "stop
and frisks"; and special FBI teams are even being used by the gov-
emnment in a new "get tough" policy to stop the skyjacker who has
commandeered a plane. All this is done in the interests of aviation
safety to protect the traveling public.
Preboard screening by airlines acting pursuant to FAA regula-
tions is subject to the constitutional prohibition against "unreason-
able" searches and seizures contained in the fourth amendment.
The courts have held that only a "scrupulous" adherence without
deviation to the approved FAA screening system will be considered
"reasonable." The governmental interest in protecting passengers
against the extreme dangers inherent in skyjacking, on balance,
have been held to outweigh the minimal invasion of personal
privacy. Moreover, a subsequent "stop and frisk" for weapons by a
deputy marshal is justified since the antecedent profile and magneto-
meter screening supplies the necessary probable cause for a body
search. The marshal searches a suspect to protect not only his im-
mediate person, but also to alleviate a potential threat to the safety
of innocent passengers. Arguably, the preboard inspection of pas-
senger carry-on and stow-away baggage is likewise "reasonable"
under this same principle if done to serve the legitimate airline in-
terest of safety and security of flight. The searches are constitu-
tionally suspect, however, if done primarily for police purposes un-
related to this fundamental airline interest.
Skyjacks have resulted in numerous injuries to pilots and crew,
and several deaths. Unfortunately, passengers are no longer free
from personal violence. Recent skyjackings have culminated in
injuries and deaths to passengers. Every skyjack potentially is a
liability creating situation. Passengers can suffer damage in many
ways and the airlines are presumably liable to the skyjack victim.
Breach of statutory or regulatory duties and breach of the common
law duty of care are two recovery theories that may be used. Of
these, breach of the duty of care is the most reliable; it has been
frequently and successfully used in aircraft litigation. United States
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citizen passengers have a statutory right not only to freedom of air
transit, but also to safe and adequate service. The common carrier
airline is obligated to provide a safe and properly equipped aircraft
as well as a skillful pilot and crew. The air carrier owes its pas-
sengers a basic and fundamental duty: the highest and utmost
degree of care for safety of flight. A breach of any of these duties
imports liability. This is so even in the face of the known skyjack
threat.
The most promising, yet apparently untried theory of recovery,
lies against the federal government, which may be sued for the
negligence of its employees under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The
decisional law is unmistakably clear-the voluntary and gratuitous
decision of the government to undertake the anti-hijack program
initially was policy making and planning and is exempt under the
discretionary function rule; but the daily on the job actions of the
FBI, deputy marshals and other federal employees are operational
and ministerial for which the government is liable if done negli-
gently. The government is committed to a program to stop sky-
jackers and skyjackings. This it must do, and do with due care.
Passengers, and even airlines, rely on the anti-hijack program to
ensure safety of air travel. The government owes the air passenger
a duty of highest care in this regard. A breach is actionable. This
theory of recovery is advanced as consistent with the government
liability developed in the air traffic control cases.
Skyjack law, both civil and criminal, is in metamorphosis. The
civil liability aspects are ripe for litigation, while the law relating
to criminal proscriptions is more firmly established. Further change
is to be expected; however, this undoubtedly will take place within
the existing framework of air law precedent. Much of this process
will depend on the ingenuity of air law practitioners.
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1961: 6 1968: 30
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two or more men 26
two or more men/women 8
man, woman, child 4
man and woman 4

















80 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [2
N \0 o C14 0r- O-1.0 t N c,
N) 0% 0 0 0OO OOO 0 -
t3
'N
"9 - 0 00 000 00 0 000 000 00
'm
1. wi. r .
r ') z <z '< Pq UU0 E-
